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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the underappreciated role of consent and 
refusal in copyright law’s fair use inquiry. As a matter of black letter law, 
the nature and circumstances of a copyright holder’s refusal to consent to a 
use are irrelevant to whether a particular use is fair.  This “standard view” 
effectively treats all situations short of affirmative consent—such as silence 
or acquiescence from a copyright holder—as equivalent to an express 
refusal.  Despite the standard view, a close analysis of the case law reveals 
that some courts implicitly consider consent-based factors in fair use 
decisions.  Other courts, however, adhere strictly to the standard view and 
disregard consent across the board.  Is there a principled basis to consider 
the nature of consent and refusal in the fair use analysis? 
This Article argues that consent, properly conceived, has an 
important role to play in certain categories of fair use cases. In particular, 
consent-based considerations should not be disregarded when they are 
relevant to the traditional fair use factors and fair use’s underlying goal of 
promoting socially-valuable uses.  To make this argument, the Article 
creates and analyzes a model of the consent-seeking interactions between 
copyright holders and users.  It concludes that a literal application of the 
standard view neglects important user reliance interests and fails to deter 
costly opportunistic behavior.  The nature of the copyright holder’s consent 
or refusal, therefore, has a critical role to play in situations involving user 
reliance interests, such as cases of “partial consent,” bad faith strategic 
behavior, and digital opt-out systems.  In these cases, consideration of 
consent and refusal accords with the traditional fair use factors and the 
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doctrine’s history as an “equitable rule of reason,” and operates to creates 
a broader scope for fair use. 
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Copyright law’s fair use doctrine relies on what might be termed a 
binary notion of consent and refusal.  If a copyright holder has given 
affirmative consent to a use of her work, then the use is permitted as 
authorized.  All other cases short of affirmative consent are treated 
equivalently—as a refusal.  As a formal matter, the fair use inquiry thus 
ignores the qualitative difference between, say, an express rejection of a 
proposed use on the one hand, and mere silence from a copyright holder on 
the other.  This deficiency is odd given that fair use was historically 
described as premised on the “implied consent” of the copyright owner to 
reasonable uses.1  As fair use doctrine has evolved, however, this notion has 
                                                
1 See Alan Latman, Study No. 14:  Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted in 
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDIES 
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been discarded as a legal fiction.2  Instead, judicial attention has focused on 
a mechanical application of the four statutory fair use factors.3  Under the 
prevailing view of fair use, unless a copyright holder gives actual consent to 
a use, her prior conduct indicating approval or disapproval, and the reasons 
for her ultimate refusal, are irrelevant.4 
Two examples may help illustrate the state of the law.  Consider first 
the pending legal challenge to the Google Books project.5  That case 
presents the question of whether Google Books—which makes the text of 
millions of books digitally searchable—should be permitted as a fair use, or 
enjoined as an infringement of authors’ copyrights.6  In constructing this 
massive information aggregation system, Google takes some care to 
accommodate differing levels of consent from copyright holders.  Books in 
the public domain are available for download in their entirety.  For in-
copyright works, the default is to allow a “snippet” view:  The full text is 
searchable, but only a line or two of text around the search term is displayed 
in response to a search query.7  If the copyright holder allows it, Google 
will show more of the work, perhaps a “preview” of several pages from the 
                                                                                                                       
NO. 14–16, at 7 (Comm. Print 1960); Saul Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43, 50 (1955) (“Frequently the courts speak of the ‘implied consent’ 
of the author to a reasonable use.”); see also Harper & Row, Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985). 
2 DAVID NIMMER ET AL., NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.05, 13-157 (2005) (“It is sometimes 
suggested that fair use is predicated on the implied or tacit consent of the author.  This is 
manifestly a fiction, for a restrictive legend on a work prohibiting copying in whole or in 
part gives no greater protection than the copyright notice standing alone.”).  Professor 
Nimmer is undoubtedly correct, of course, that implied consent is literally a “fiction”; a 
true fair use is permitted even in the face of strong disapproval of the copyright holder.  
However, the issue is whether that fiction is, nonetheless, a useful concept.  See generally 
LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 113–19 (1967). 
3 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2011) (listing the fair use factors); infra Part I. 
4 See Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology, 533 F.3d 1287, 1308 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (rejecting the copyright holder’s past conduct indicating assent an additional fair 
use factor); John S. Sieman, Using the Implied License to Inject Common Sense into 
Digital Copyright, 85 N.C. L. REV. 885, 918 (2007) ( “Fair use does not take the intent of 
the copyright owner into consideration . . . .”); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use 
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1128–29 (1990) (rejecting notion that “the conduct and 
intentions of the plaintiff copyright holder” should be a factor in the fair analysis). 
5 See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(holding reproduction of millions of books for use in the Google Books project was a fair 
use).  The district court’s ruling is currently on appeal.  See Notice of Appeal, Authors 
Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., Dkt. No. 1092, No. 05 CIV. 8136 DC (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2013). 
6 Authors Guild, 954 F. Supp. at 282. 
7 See James Grimmelman, The Elephantine Google Books Settlement, 58 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 701, 703 (2011). 
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book.8  In contrast, if the copyright holder specifically objects, Google will 
not display even the snippets.9 
The significance of this “opt out” structure presents something of a 
puzzle.  Intuitively, if the fair use inquiry reflects an assessment of the 
social value of a use, the opt out functionality seems relevant.  It provides a 
way to realize the benefits of the Google Books project while still allowing 
objecting rightsholders to easily choose not to participate.  But if Google 
Books’ snippets are a fair use, Google is free to override the wishes of the 
copyright holder.  It should not matter whether a given author objects, or 
had an earlier opportunity to opt out of the project.  On the standard view of 
fair use, Google’s good-faith attempt to accommodate competing interests 
by providing an opt out is irrelevant to whether its use is fair.10  Indeed, in 
reaching its conclusion that Google Books was a fair use, a recent court 
decision completely ignored this opt out structure.11   
For a more analog example, consider the facts of Peter Letterese & 
Associates v. World Institute of Scientology Enterprises.12  In that case, the 
user—the Church of Scientology—had adapted aspects of a copyrighted 
sales manual into its training manuals.13  This use was arguably fair—very 
little expression was taken—but in any event, it was made with the 
participation and involvement of both the original author and the copyright 
holder, and continued for decades without objection.14  After a falling out 
between the copyright holder and user, however, an infringement action 
followed.  The district court thought that consent was relevant to the 
fairness of the use.15  The user, after all, relied on the apparent permission 
from the copyright holder in initially making the use, and because aspects of 
                                                
8 See Google Books, Partner Program Tour, available at 
http://www.google.com/googlebooks/partners/tour.html; Authors Guild, 954 F. Supp. at 
282. 
9 Grimmelman, supra note 7, at 703; About Google Books, Information for Publishers and 
Authors about the Library Project, available at http://books.google.com/intl/en-
US/googlebooks/publisher_library.html (“We're happy to remove your book from our 
search results at any time . . . .”). 
10 See John Sieman, supra note 4, at 908–09 (“Google chooses to be a ‘polite’ search 
engine that respects the wishes of [copyright holders]. . . .  Whether [choosing to opt out] 
has any legal force at all is extremely unclear . . . .”); supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
But see Matthew Sag, The Google Book Settlement and the Fair Use Counterfactual, 55 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 19, 30–31 (arguing that “the opt-out provision” should make Google’s 
fair use arguments stronger under the “purpose of the use” factor).  
11 See Authors Guild, 954 F. Supp. at 282. 
12 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008) 
13 Id. at 1294. 
14 Id. at 1295–97. 
15 Id. at 1308. 
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the original work were now incorporated into a larger whole, “undoing” the 
use decades later could be difficult and costly.  The Eleventh Circuit, 
however, relied on the standard view of consent in fair use to disregard this 
context.16 
This Article challenges the standard view of the role of consent in 
fair use cases.  It argues that the form and nature of a copyright holder’s 
refusal to consent should not always be ignored in the fair use analysis.  
This Article claims that consideration of consent, in certain classes of cases, 
is normatively desirable and encourages efficient communication between 
users and copyright holders.  Accordingly, it urges courts to make the 
nature of the copyright holder’s consent an explicit consideration. 
To be clear, consent should not be the sole consideration in the fair 
use analysis, or even a factor at all in many cases.  In the usual case, where 
there is an express, good-faith refusal from a copyright holder, the user’s 
failure to obtain consent is not of any relevance.  Fair use is designed, after 
all, to define the types of uses that should be permitted in spite of the 
copyright holder’s refusal.  But this does not foreclose the converse 
possibility—that a copyright holder’s apparent consent ought to weigh in 
favor of fair use.  As this Article argues, the nature of the copyright holder’s 
refusal to consent has a critical role to play in some fair use cases.  In 
particular, consent need not be ignored when it would be otherwise relevant 
to the traditional fair use factors.  The wide-ranging, fact-sensitive fair use 
inquiry can readily accommodate this additional consideration. 
Applying this proposal to the examples above, the fact that Google 
Books provides copyright holders with low-cost mechanisms to opt out—
and that a copyright holder neglected to opt out despite awareness of the 
option—should tend to weigh in favor of fair use.  Similarly, in the 
Letterese case, the fact that the use was created in reliance on apparent 
consent from the rightsholder should permit a broader scope for fair use.  Ex 
ante, applying fair use doctrine in this matter will enable potential users to 
rely on external appearances of consent, even if they fall short of the 
exacting requirements for a binding implied license.17  It will operate, in 
effect, to put a somewhat greater burden on copyright holders to 
affirmatively assert their rights, which are granted by default.18 
                                                
16 Id. (“The district court explicitly adopted a ‘fifth’ [fair use] factor, which it described as 
‘the copyright owner’s actual consent to the use’ . . . . This was incorrect . . . .”). 
17 Because copyright law requires a written agreement for transfer of ownership, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 204, licenses are implied by conduct only in “narrow circumstances.”  Estate of Roberto 
Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2010).  
18 Current U.S. law grants copyright automatically to original works once they are fixed in 
a tangible medium—that is, written down.  No other affirmative action—such as affixing a 
© symbol or registering the work—is required.  See infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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Despite its normative appeal, the role of consent and refusal has 
largely gone unrecognized in the extensive commentary on the fair use 
doctrine.19  Two interrelated reasons may explain why.  First, as discussed 
above, the reasons for the user’s failure to obtain consent, and the copyright 
holder’s reasons for his refusal, are irrelevant as a matter of black letter 
law.20  Second, the fair use inquiry primarily takes the perspective of the 
copyright user in evaluating the fairness of the use at issue:  Was the 
alleged infringer’s use “transformative”?  Was the unauthorized use made 
for a commercial, noncommercial, or educational purpose?  How much of 
the original work was used?21  By contrast, the perspective taken in this 
Article focuses part of the inquiry on the copyright holder’s actions:  Why is 
                                                
19 There are a few exceptions.  John Sieman has examined the importance of opt out 
systems in digital copyright cases, but ultimately rejects their relevance to fair use inquiry, 
instead arguing that the presence of an opt out creates an implied nonexclusive license from 
the website owner.  See Sieman, supra note 4, at 886–87.  Professor Matthew Mattioli has 
advanced the notion that the presence of an “opt out” system should be considered as an 
additional fair use factor, but his analysis is limited to the digital copyright context and he 
does not consider this Article’s broader claim that the nature of the copyright holder’s 
nonconsent have relevance outside of digital “opt out” systems.  See Matthew Mattioli, 
Opting Out:  Procedural Fair Use, 12 VA. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2007).  Professor Wendy 
Gordon touches upon the notion of “apparent consent” in her classic study of transaction 
costs in fair use, though she addresses only the specific case of when a user mistakenly 
believes the author consented, and offers a different economic justification.  See Wendy J. 
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:  A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax 
Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1641–43 (1982).  Professor Randal 
C. Picker has discussed the historical and continuing use of technological protection 
measures to coerce a user’s consent and contribute to the “propertization of copyright,” 
such as the use of encryption to limit the place and manner one can listen to purchased 
music.  See Randal C. Picker, From Edison To The Broadcast Flag:  Mechanisms Of 
Consent And Refusal And The Propertization Of Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 283 
(2003).  
20 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 585 n.18 (1994) (“[W]e reject 
Acuff-Rose’s argument that 2 Live Crew's request for permission to use the original should 
be weighed against a finding of fair use.”); Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of 
Scientology, 533 F.3d 1297, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008) (rejecting “the copyright holder’s actual 
consent” as a fifth fair use factor); see generally NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 13.05 (2005).  
However, as discussed infra in Part V, some courts have implicitly been sensitive to these 
considerations despite their formal irrelevance.  See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (noting The Nation’s “clandestine” conduct in 
obtaining manuscript in finding against fair use). 
21 See infra note 49 and accompanying text.  While one of the four fair use factors 
addresses the “nature of the copyrighted work,” this factor is typically summarily treated, 
and, empirically, has been found to have the least impact on case outcomes.  See Barton 
Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. 
L. REV. 549, 584 (“[F]actor two correlated weakly, if at all, with the outcome of the [fair 
use] test.”).  
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she not consenting to the use?  Did the alleged infringer ask her?  Did she 
have an opportunity to object to the use beforehand? 
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows.  Part I 
provides the necessary background on copyright’s fair use defense, 
presenting the four statutory “fair use factors” and the significant judicial 
interpretations of the same.  Part II critiques the standard view that the 
nature of the user’s failure to obtain consent is irrelevant to the fair use 
inquiry.  The standard view maintains that consent cannot be a fair use 
factor because the user’s failure to obtain consent is, by definition, present 
in every fair use case.  But this logic holds only if consent is a binary 
notion:  either the user has affirmatively obtained consent, or he has not.  As 
this Article argues, this binary elides a wide variety of significantly distinct 
conduct.  Mere silence from a copyright holder, for example, is qualitatively 
different from an affirmative expression of approval or disapproval.  A user 
may fail to obtain consent prior to his use because he is unable to identify 
the copyright owner, because he believes his use to be fair in good faith, or 
because he chose not to ask permission in order to avoid detection.  There is 
no reason that the fair use inquiry should treat all these situations 
identically.  Moreover, the standard view fails to appreciate the ways in 
which these intermediate varieties of consent may be relevant to the 
traditional fair use factors.  The standard view has therefore contributed to 
confusion in the case law, with some courts implicitly considering consent 
despite its formal irrelevance. 
Part III turns to the affirmative case that the nature of consent and 
refusal should be considered as a fair use factor in some cases.  The 
argument has two key components.  The first sounds in efficiency:  
consideration of the nature of consent encourages ex ante preference 
revelation by copyright holders and avoids costly ex post disputes.  Current 
doctrine creates incentives for both users and copyright holders to act 
strategically in their consent-seeking interactions.  For example, a copyright 
owner may fail to express his nonconsent early on, despite an opportunity to 
do so, springing up only later when the use has proven valuable and the user 
is locked in.  Consideration of consent as a fair use factor punishes the 
copyright holder for failing to make her preferences known—in effect, her 
silence is treated as an implied assent—and thus encourages her to object 
when she has the opportunity.  Similarly, a user who knows his use to be 
unfair should be discouraged from failing to request permission in order to 
avoid detection of that use.  Considering consent can therefore operate as a 
preference-revealing mechanism that deters strategic conduct and limits 
costly ex post disputes by encouraging resolution of the status of the 
copyright holder’s preferences prior to the use. 
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The second argument in favor of the proposal is based on history 
and the normative purposes of fair use.  In short, consideration of the nature 
of the copyright holder’s refusal, when relevant, is more faithful than the 
current rule to fair use’s nature as an “equitable rule of reason.”22  That is, 
while fair use analysis is primarily concerned with factors relating to the 
nature of the use itself, that should not necessarily end the inquiry.  
Reliance, good faith, and other equitable factors relating more to the 
litigants than to the use can also be important in deciding what is “fair.”  In 
other words, while transaction costs, a just intellectual culture, 
transformative uses, and the spillover social benefits of the use are 
important,23 courts should not neglect the fact that fair use is also about 
courts deciding cases in an equitable manner.  One of fair use’s virtues is its 
flexible, contextual, and fact-sensitive nature.24  It is thus a feature, and not 
a flaw, of this Article’s proposal that an identical use may be permitted in 
one context (e.g., when the use was made in reliance on the acquiescence of 
the copyright holder), but not another (when that same use was made, but 
no permission was sought in order to avoid detection). 
Turning from theory to application, Part IV makes the proposal 
more concrete by developing a typology of the consent-seeking interactions 
between the copyright owner and potential users.  Part V applies this 
typology to examine the role that consent plays in a variety of fair use cases.  
                                                
22 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 n.31 
(1984). 
23 See generally Gordon, supra note 19 (arguing that fair use plays a key role in cases when 
an efficient market transaction is prohibited by transaction costs and other market failures); 
William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 
1774 (1988) (arguing that fair use should operate to promote a “just and attractive 
intellectual culture”); Leval, supra note 4 (arguing for increased focus on whether the new 
work “transforms” the original); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 257, 286–89 (2007) (arguing that the spillover benefits of the use to third 
parties should play critical role in fair use). 
24 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65–66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5678–80 (“Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine 
over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since the 
doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and 
each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts”.).  Of course, many 
commentators consider this flexibility to be a flaw, criticizing fair use for its 
“unpredictable” nature.  See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright 
Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271, 1284  (“Fair use therefore remains fairly 
unpredictable and uncertain in many settings.”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. 
Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1485–86 (2007) (“[T]he case law is 
characterized by widely divergent interpretations of fair use, divided courts, and frequent 
reversals. . . .  The ambiguity of the fair use doctrine works as a one-way ratchet that will in 
many cases lead to the underuse of copyrighted works.”). 
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It builds on recent work by Pamela Samuelson and Michael Madison that 
considers fair use cases in common patterns of “policy-relevant clusters.”25  
Looking to categories of fair use cases involving user reliance and strategic 
behaviors, this Part critiques those courts that have ignored the nature of the 
copyright holder’s consent.  It also reveals that some courts have implicitly 
considered the nature of consent in their fair use analysis, despite the black 
letter law to the contrary.  In those cases, the proposed consent framework 
offers a satisfying explanation of otherwise-perplexing features of fair use 
doctrine. 
Part VI addresses potential criticisms of this Article’s proposal.  The 
Article concludes that consistency in judicial decisionmaking, as well as 
sound policy, would be better served by considering the nature of the 
copyright holder’s consent or refusal in cases involving user reliance 
interests and strategic behavior.  
I. FAIR USE BASICS 
As many scholars have observed, the basic design of the Copyright 
Act favors protection of works:  the Act pairs broad statements of the 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights with narrow, detailed exceptions to those 
broad rights.26  In this sense, the Copyright Act’s default rule may be said to 
favor the copyright holder—once a user, for example, makes a derivative 
work based upon a preexisting copyrighted work, he must usually satisfy 
the elements of a specific statutory exception to avoid liability.27 
The fair use doctrine, as a broad limitation on copyright’s reach, is 
the principal exception to that general structure.  Fair use was initially 
developed in a common law fashion by the courts as an implied exception 
for “reasonable” and “customary” uses;28 it was not codified until the 1976 
general Copyright Act revision.  The main debate surrounding the 1976 
codification of fair use centered less on the precise statutory language, and 
more on whether the Act should avoid congressional interference with the 
                                                
25 Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009); Michael 
J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 
(2004). 
26 See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 17–19, 54–63 (2d ed. 2006); Beebe, 
supra note 21, at 557–58.  See also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1)–(6) (2011) (granting copyright 
owners the exclusive right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies,” “to prepare 
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work,” “to distribute copies,” et al.). 
27 Such specific exceptions include, for example, 17 U.S.C. Sections 108 (limitation for 
certain “reproductions by libraries and archives”) and 111 (limitation for certain 
“secondary transmissions of broadcast recordings by cable systems”).   
28 See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J.); see generally 
Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371 (2011). 
9
Hickey: Consent, User Reliance, and Fair Use
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
CONSENT, USER RELIANCE, AND FAIR USE 
 
406 
doctrine and decline to reference fair use at all.29  Section 107 of the 
Copyright Act split the difference by codifying the fair use doctrine in 
general terms, but expressly stating that Congress did not intend to “freeze” 
the judicial development of fair use.30  The provision reads in full: 
Notwithstanding the [exclusive rights of copyright holders], 
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by 
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other 
means specified by that section, for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, 
is not an infringement of copyright.  In determining whether 
the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the 
factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a 
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration 
of all the above factors.31 
Despite the explicit congressional intention that this codification not 
disrupt the judicial development of the doctrine, the four “fair use factors” 
have nevertheless become the core of modern fair use doctrine, with many 
courts mechanically applying statutory considerations as a four factor test.32  
                                                
29 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66; Latman, supra note 1, at 32–44. 
30 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (“The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the 
judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine . . . .  Section 
107 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or 
enlarge it in any way.”). 
31 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2011).  The only substantive amendment since the 1976 codification 
was the addition of the final sentence regarding unpublished works.  See Pub. L. No. 102-
492, 106 Stat. 3145 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107).  This was a congressional response to a 
line of Second Circuit decisions that had suggested that uses of unpublished works were 
presumptively unfair.  See generally Kenneth D. Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works:  
Burdens Of Proof and the Integrity Of Copyright, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 12–52 (1999) 
(reviewing case law and legislative history of the 1992 amendment). 
32 See Beebe, supra note 21, at 561–64. 
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While a detailed discussion of each of the four factors and the judicial 
interpretations of them is beyond the scope of this Article and may be found 
elsewhere,33 an overview of the key considerations for each factor is in 
order: 
Factor One:  The Purpose and Character of the Use.  This broad 
and important consideration captures the intended aim of the use, with 
educational, newsreporting, critical, and noncommercial uses favored over 
commercial ones.  The first factor also addresses whether a use is 
“transformative,” i.e., whether it “adds something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message.”34  Courts have generally afforded 
“transformativeness” a broad purview beyond literal transformations such 
as criticisms and parodies.35  Uses will be considered transformative if they 
are made for a sufficiently distinct purpose or function—such as a search 
engine36 or anti-plagiarism database37—even though the content of the 
original work is not itself altered.  Transformative uses, like noncommercial 
uses, are favored under the first fair use factor.   
Factor Two:  The Nature of the Copyrighted Work.  The second 
factor relates to the type of copyrighted work at issue.  It has essentially two 
components:  whether a work is published or unpublished, and whether a 
work is creative, as opposed to factual or informational.  Unpublished 
works are afforded broader copyright protection and a narrower fair use 
defense;38 in fact, at common law, the use of unpublished works was never 
fair.39  In the case of informational works, such as a newspaper article, the 
fair use defense is broader vis-à-vis creative works like a novel or a 
                                                
33 Readers interested in the doctrinal details are directed to William Patry’s thorough 
treatise, PATRY ON FAIR USE (2012). 
34 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Leval, supra note 4, at 1111). 
35 See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 
2001) (criticisms are a transformative use); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579–83 (parodies are a 
transformative use). 
36 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1164–68 (9th Cir. 2007). 
37 See A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, 562 F.3d 630, 639–40 (4th Cir. 2009). 
38 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551 (“[I]t has never been seriously disputed that "the fact 
that the plaintiff's work is unpublished . . . is a factor tending to negate the defense of fair 
use.’”) (citation omitted).   
39 See e.g., Prince Albert v. Strange, (1849) 64 Eng. Rep. 293, 311 (V.C.); Salinger v. 
Random House, 811 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[C]ommon law, especially as developed 
in England, appears to have denied the defense of fair use to unpublished works . . . .”).  
The fair use statute now makes clear that while the published or unpublished nature of a 
work is a factor in the fair use, it is not a determinative one.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2011) 
(“The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding 
is made upon consideration of [the statutory] factors.”). 
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painting.40  Indeed, factual works are generally afforded weaker copyright 
protection because of the fundamental copyright principle that unoriginal 
facts are not themselves copyrightable.41  In short, the second fair use factor 
disfavors the use of unpublished works and creative works. 
Factor Three:  The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used.  
Factor three captures the notion that, other things being equal, a use is more 
likely to be fair if it copies only a small amount from the original.  Copying 
an entire book verbatim is obviously quite different than just quoting a 
sentence or two.  Though intuitively straightforward, two glosses on this 
factor complicate the analysis.  First, how much was copied may be 
assessed on a qualitative level:  its “substantiality.”  In other words, copying 
of the “heart of the work”—the main source of its economic value—may be 
unfair even though only a small amount of actual expression is taken.42  For 
example, in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, though the number of 
words copied from President Ford’s memoir was “insubstantial,” the third 
factor favored the copyright holder because the small part that was taken 
was the primary matter that readers were interested in:  why Ford had 
pardoned Richard Nixon.43  The second complication is that even literal 
copying of an entire work may be fair if the amount taken is necessary for a 
legitimate purpose, such as a sufficiently transformative use.44  The third 
fair use factor thus disfavors excessive copying, unless necessary for a 
privileged use. 
Factor Four:  The Effect of the Use on the Potential Market for the 
Copyrighted Work.  The final factor, sometimes considered the most 
important,45 relates to whether the use detrimentally impacts the market for 
                                                
40 See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(“Works of fiction receive greater protection than works that have strong factual elements . 
. . .”). 
41 Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991). 
42 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564–66. 
43 Id.  
44 See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he extent 
of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the use.  If the secondary 
user only copies as much as is necessary for his or her intended use, then [factor three] will 
not weigh against him or her.”); Field v. Google, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1120–21 (D. Nev. 
2006) (wholesale copying of entire websites for search engine purposes was found to be 
fair because of its highly transformative nature). 
45 This perception is due to the Supreme Court’s remark in Harper & Row that the fourth 
factor was “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”  471 U.S. at 566.  
The Court later walked back this sweeping statement.  See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–78 
(“The [fair use test] is not to be simplified with bright-line rules for the statute . . .  Nor 
may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be 
explored, and the results weighed together. . . .”). 
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the copyright owner’s original work.  If it has a substantial effect on the 
market, the use undermines the copyright owner’s incentives to create the 
original and will tend to be found unfair.46  This principle is subject to some 
important limitations.  First, there is the danger of circularity in considering 
lost licensing revenue as a market harm:  by determining whether a use is 
fair or unfair, the court is essentially deciding whether a licensing market 
should exist for this use.47  The focus, then, should primarily be on whether 
the use functions as an economic substitute for the original.  Second, not all 
economic harms are properly weighed under this factor.  A dismissive book 
review or biting parody may undermine the market for the original, but they 
do not create harms that are cognizable under the Copyright Act.48  The 
fourth factor only disfavors uses that diminish demand because they serve 
as substitutes for the original work. 
Two features of these statutory factors are noteworthy for present 
purposes.  First, the statutory factors focus primarily on the perspective of 
the user, not of the copyright holder.  Two of the four factors—the purpose 
and character of the use, and the amount of the original work that was 
used—are wholly devoted to examining what the copyright user has done.  
The fourth factor—the effect of the use upon the potential market for the 
copyrighted work—necessarily relates both to the original and to the use, as 
it captures an economic interaction between the use and the original.  Only 
one factor of the four—the nature of the copyrighted work—wholly 
examines the issue from the perspective of the copyright holder.  This 
factor, notably, is considered to be the least important fair use factor, and 
has been found to exert almost no influence on the actual outcomes of fair 
use cases.49   
                                                
46 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450–51 (1984). 
47 See Fisher, supra note 23, at 1671–72. 
48 See Leval, supra note 4, at 1125; Campbell, 471 U.S. at 591–92. 
49 See Beebe, supra note 21, at 584–85; Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 47, 77 (2012).  Instead, it is the first and fourth factors that tend to dictate case 
outcomes. Beebe, supra note 21, at 586 (“It is certainly interesting to observe, now based 
on empirical evidence, that the outcome of the fourth factor appears to drive the outcome of 
the test, and that the outcome of the first factor also appears to be highly influential.”).  
This is not to say that the second factor is never important, of course.  For example, it can 
be seen to weigh heavily in “reverse engineering” fair use cases, where copies of a 
computer program are disassembled to achieve interoperability or other ends.  There, the 
highly factual nature of the work—“computer programs are, in essence, utilitarian 
articles”—appears to influence the outcome.  See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 
977 F.2d 1510, 1524–27 (9th Cir. 1992); Samuelson, supra note 25, at 2605–10; Madison, 
supra note 25, at 1656–59. 
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Second, the four statutory factors are nonexclusive by design.50  
Courts have discretion to consider a variety of other factors, and they often 
do so.  For example, courts sometimes look to whether the user attributed 
the original author—as opposed to passing off copied material as his own—
finding that proper attribution tends to favor fair use.51  Similarly, deliberate 
distortions or errors that misrepresent the original may disfavor fair use.52  
In general, bad faith by the defendant will weigh against fair use, though 
this consideration is controversial.53  The key point is that courts are entitled 
to extend the fair use inquiry beyond the four statutory factors.  In fact, 
Congress has explicitly endorsed this practice.54  
II. THE STANDARD VIEW:  CONSENT IS IRRELEVANT 
As the preceding section demonstrates, fair use is a flexible and 
wide-ranging inquiry.  Despite the capacious nature of fair use, the 
circumstances surrounding a user’s failure to obtain consent from the 
copyright holder are generally not considered as a matter of black letter law.  
This section explains and critiques the standard view that rejects the 
copyright holder’s consent as a fair use factor.   
A. The Seeming Logic of the Standard View 
The logic of the standard view rests on a conflation of all conduct 
that falls short of actual consent.  The argument runs roughly thus:  The fair 
use defense is needed only when the use is unauthorized, for if the user has 
actual permission for her use, there is no infringement of the copyright and 
                                                
50 See generally Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 at 549–50 
(1985) (describing “nonexclusive” nature of statutory fair use factors). 
51 See, e.g., Williamson v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 2001 WL 1262964, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
52 See, e.g., Maxtone–Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1261 (2d Cir. 1986). 
53 Compare NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Institute, 364 F.3d 471, 479 (2d Cir. 2004) (considering 
bad faith as a nondispositive subfactor of the “purpose and character of the use”) with id. at  
483–487 (Jacobs, J., concurring) (“[T]he secondary user's good or bad faith in gaining 
access to the original copyrighted material ought to have no bearing on the availability of a 
fair use defense.”) and Leval, supra note 4, at 1125–28 (arguing that “good faith” should 
not be considered as a fair use factor).  See also Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 
CAL. L. REV. 263, 265 (2009) (arguing that recognition of moral rights such as attribution 
and integrity is undesirable because it “fails to recognize the profound artistic importance 
of modifying, even destroying, works of art, and of freeing art from the control of the 
artist”). 
54 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“the factors to be considered shall include . . .”); H.R. Rep. No. 
102-836, at 9 (1992) (“[T]he courts, in their discretion, may weigh factors in addition to 
those set forth in the statute.”). 
14
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 16 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol16/iss2/4
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 397 (2014)  2013-2014  
411 
no need for the fair use defense.55  In every fair use case, then, the user has 
failed to obtain consent from the copyright holder.  How, then, could 
consent be a factor?  It would appear to always cut the same way. 
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Peter Letterese & Associates v. 
World Institute of Scientology provides an example of the standard view.56  
The work at issue in Letterese was a 1971 book by Les Dane called Big 
League Sales, which described sales closing techniques.57  With Dane’s 
knowledge and participation, Church of Scientology founder L. Ron 
Hubbard incorporated aspects of Big League Sales into Church seminars 
and teaching materials in the 1970s and 80s.58  Peter Letterese, a member of 
the Church who had learned Dane’s techniques at such seminars, acquired 
the copyright to Big League Sales with the intention of “making [his] own 
use” of the book as well as “keeping it available to the Church.”59  Mr. 
Letterese, however, was later excommunicated from the Church, and 
eventually brought a suit in 2004 against several Scientology entities for 
copyright infringement when they continued to use their adaptations of 
material from Dane’s book.60 
The district court in Letterese thought that this course of conduct 
was relevant to the fair use inquiry and considered “the copyright owner’s 
actual consent” as a fair use factor.  The lower court relied the evidence that 
“both [the author and the copyright owner] knew of, assented to, and 
participated in Defendants’ use for decades,” along with the four traditional 
fair use factors, to conclude that the Church’s use was fair.61  The Eleventh 
Circuit rejected the consent consideration: 
The district court explicitly adopted a “fifth” [fair use] 
factor, which it described as “the copyright owner’s actual 
consent to the use” . . .  This was incorrect, both in terms of 
logic and precedent.  As the district court itself recognized, 
the existence of actual consent negates the necessity of 
conducting a fair use analysis in the first place, as the 
existence of a license is an independent affirmative defense 
to a claim of copyright infringement.  See Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 155 F.3d 140, 144 n. 2 (2d Cir.1998) 
                                                
55 17 U.S.C. § 106 (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do 
and to authorize [reproductions, derivative works, et al.]”). 
56 533 F.3d 1287, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008). 
57 Id. at 1294. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 1295–96.   
60 Id. at 1295, 1297. 
61 Id. at 1308. 
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(“The doctrine of ‘fair use’ allows the appropriation of a 
copyrighted work without consent under certain 
circumstances.”) (emphasis added). Actual consent therefore 
is not properly a factor in fair use analysis.62 
Courts like Letterese thus reason that because actual consent from the 
copyright owner negates the need for a fair use analysis, actions falling 
short of effective consent are irrelevant to fair use. 
B. Critiques of the Standard View 
1. Consent Is Not a Binary Concept 
The first response to this reasoning is that the conclusion simply 
does not follow:  The fact that actual consent negates the need for fair use 
does not imply that the past conduct of the copyright owner indicating 
consent is necessarily irrelevant.  In some cases, like Letterese, there is a 
course of dealing that comes very close to actual consent, even though that 
conduct may fall short of what is necessary for an express or implied 
license.63  There is no reason that this sort of “partial consent” must be 
treated the same as an express refusal.  In fact, as this Article argues, there 
are reasons to consider such gradations of consent as a fair use factor in 
some cases.64 
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of whether 
the nature of the copyright holder’s refusal is properly considered as a fair 
use factor, but it touched on the matter in its leading fair use decision, 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music.65  Campbell addressed whether the rap 
group 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s famous song “Oh, Pretty 
Woman” was a fair use.66  Before the parody was released for sale, 2 Live 
Crew’s manager approached Acuff-Rose Music (the copyright holder) and 
offered to pay them a fee for the use.  Acuff-Rose categorically refused to 
                                                
62 Id. 
63 Letterese does not appear to have raised this issue directly.  See id. at 1298 (only 
“affirmative defenses” raised were “fair use” and “laches”).  Copyright law requires a 
written agreement for transfer of ownership, 17 U.S.C. § 204, so only nonexclusive 
licenses may be implied from conduct.  It is not always easy to prove an implied copyright 
license, as some courts require that the work be created at the request of the putative 
licensee.  See, e.g., Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., 284 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 
2002); Sieman, supra note 4, at 899. 
64 See infra Part III. 
65 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
66 Id. at 571–72. 
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license, but 2 Live Crew released the record nonetheless.67  While the bulk 
of the Campbell decision addressed other issues,68 a footnote asked whether 
2 Live Crew’s request for a license evinced bad faith that should weigh 
against fair use: 
[R]egardless of the weight one might place on the alleged 
infringer's state of mind . . . we reject Acuff-Rose’s argument 
that 2 Live Crew's request for permission to use the original 
should be weighed against a finding of fair use. Even if good 
faith were central to fair use, 2 Live Crew's actions do not 
necessarily suggest that they believed their version was not 
fair use; the offer may simply have been made in a good-
faith effort to avoid this litigation. If the use is otherwise fair, 
then no permission need be sought or granted. Thus, being 
denied permission to use a work does not weigh against a 
finding of fair use.69 
The Court in Campbell thus rejected the notion that a copyright user’s 
request for permission to make a use should be held against him.  But this 
does not foreclose the converse proposition:  that an ex ante request for 
permission should weigh in favor of the user.  This equivocal footnote may 
explain, however, the persistence of the standard view that the nature of the 
copyright holder’s refusal is irrelevant.70 
In sum, the logic underlying the standard view rests on a conflation 
of all conduct short of actual consent by the copyright holder.  There is no 
necessary reason, however, that the fair use doctrine must conceptualize 
consent and refusal in this way.  Instead, one may conceive of consent and 
refusal as a continuum, with equivocal conduct—such as silence from a 
copyright holder, or actions indicating but not explicitly granting consent—
lying between the extremes of express approval and disapproval.  Once this 
conceptualization is made, there is no a priori reason that such intermediate 
varieties of consent may not be considered in appropriate cases. 
                                                
67 Id. at 572–73. 
68 The principal motivation for the opinion was to decide whether a parody’s commercial 
nature creates a presumption against fair use.  Id. at 573–74, 583–85.  
69 Id. at 585 n.18 (citations omitted). 
70 Cf. Beebe, supra note 21, at 612–13 (describing “unintended consequence[s]” of 
Supreme Court fair use dicta in the context of whether uses of unpublished works are 
presumptively unfair). 
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2. Consent’s Relevance to the Traditional Fair Use Factors 
The standard view is also flawed in that it fails to consider the 
possibility that intermediate varieties of consent may be relevant to the 
traditional statutory fair use factors.  Consider the cases of “partial consent,” 
where the copyright holder has implicitly indicated that she approves the 
use, or silence from a copyright holder despite awareness of a use.  In either 
case, the copyright holder’s failure to object to a known use would tend to 
indicate that, at least in her view, there is little market harm resulting from 
the use under the fourth fair use factor, which should weigh in favor of fair 
use.  Similarly, if the copyright holder’s failure to object was motivated by 
strategic considerations, this would tend to indicate bad faith, which is 
sometimes considered under the first fair use factor. 
For this reason, perhaps, some courts appear to consider aspects of 
consent in fair use despite its formal irrelevance.  One example is Field v. 
Google,71 which challenged Google’s caching functionality as a massive 
copyright infringement.  In the process of indexing the Internet’s websites 
for its search engine, Google creates a copy of the material on each website 
that it temporarily archives, or “caches.”72  This cached version serves 
several purposes, such as improving the speed of searches and allowing 
users to access a website that is inaccessible due to heavy traffic or server 
issues.73   
Google’s caching was alleged to infringe website owners’ 
copyrights because it creates unauthorized, wholesale reproductions of 
websites.74  However, the Field court permitted it as a fair use.75  In 
reaching that conclusion, the decision noted that Google provides simple 
mechanisms through which any website owner may easily “opt out” of 
caching, or of being indexed by Google entirely.76  Field, the plaintiff, was 
aware of how to opt out of caching, but chose to make his works publicly 
available online with the specific intent of filing a copyright action against 
Google.77   
On the standard understanding of fair use, as noted above, Google’s 
opt out functionality is irrelevant.78  Nonetheless, Field’s knowing failure to 
                                                
71 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). 
72 See id. at 1110–11. 
73 Id. at 1111–12; see generally Wikipedia, Web Cache, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_cache (last accessed July 10, 2014). 
74 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1110–11. 
75 See id. at 1123. 
76 See id. at 1112–13, 1119. 
77 See id. at 1113–14.  
78 See supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text. 
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opt out appears to inform the court’s analysis in the Field case.  This is 
likely because Field, the plaintiff, acted with obvious bad faith.79  Though 
the court mentions opt out functionality only briefly in its discussion of the 
fair use factors,80 Field’s disingenuous conduct colors its analysis.  
Similarly, Field’s failure to opt out tends to indicate that Google’s caching 
did not cause any harm to the market for his website.81  Field v. Google thus 
demonstrates that courts sometimes intuitively consider consent despite the 
standard view that consent is always irrelevant. 
III. THE CASE FOR CONSENT AS A FAIR USE FACTOR 
Having disposed of the standard view’s notion that consent cannot, 
as a matter of logic, be considered as a fair use factor, this Part argues that 
the circumstances surrounding the user’s failure to obtain consent from the 
copyright holder should be considered in fair use analysis.  The first Section 
relies on an economic model of author-user interactions to argue that 
consideration of the copyright holder’s consent or refusal deters costly 
strategic behavior, and encourages good faith dealing between authors and 
users.  The second Section argues that considering consent accords with fair 
use’s nature as a flexible “equitable rule of reason” that should rightly 
concern itself with good faith and the reliance interests of the user and 
copyright holder. 
A. Efficiency and Incentives 
1. A Model of Author-User Interaction 
In abstract terms, a typical fair use case proceeds as follows:  The 
author creates an original work.  (For simplicity, the model will presume 
that no transfer of copyright has occurred, i.e., the original author retains the 
copyright.82)  At some later time, the purported fair user wishes to make 
                                                
79 Indeed, the court separately held that Field’s claim was independently barred on the basis 
of estoppel.  Id. at 1117. 
80 See id. at 1119 (“Fifth, Google ensures that any site owner can disable the cache 
functionality for any of the pages on its site in a matter of seconds. . . .  Thus, site owners, 
and not Google, control whether “Cached” links will appear for their pages.”) (citation 
omitted). 
81 See id. at 1122 (“Notwithstanding Google's long-standing display of ‘Cached’ links and 
the well-known industry standard protocols for instructing search engines not to display 
them, the owners of literally billions of Web pages choose to permit such links to be 
displayed.”). 
82 Copyright generally initially vests in a work’s author, 17 U.S.C. § 201(a)–(b) (2011), but 
the author is free to transfer his rights in whole or in part, id. § 201(d), and it is common to 
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some use of the original, e.g., to quote from it or incorporate aspects into a 
different work. 
In thinking through the model, it may be helpful to envision the 
situation as a close fair use case—that is, evaluation of the four traditional 
fair use factors (and any additional non-consent considerations) leaves the 
balancing test roughly in equipoise.  In other words, there are reasonable 
arguments that use is fair under the standard factors, and roughly equally 
reasonable arguments that it is not. 
As a concrete example, consider the facts of Harper & Row, a fair 
use case that divided the Supreme Court six to three against fair use.83  
Harper & Row addressed whether The Nation magazine’s “scoop” of 
President Ford’s unpublished memoir was a fair use.84  Having received a 
prepublication copy from an unidentified source, the magazine quoted and 
paraphrased from the forthcoming memoir to produce an article detailing 
Ford’s pardon of former President Richard Nixon.85  Evaluation of the 
traditional fair use factors yields an inconclusive result in Harper & Row.  
On the one hand, The Nation’s purpose is newsreporting (privileged under 
the first factor), the underlying work is factual, and the amount of actual 
expression taken was very small—by the dissent’s count, only 300 words 
from a 200,000 word manuscript.86  On the other hand, the memoir was 
unpublished, the scoop directly harmed the market for the memoir, and 
those 300 words were arguably the “heart of the work.”87  In a close case 
like Harper & Row, the consent consideration may make the difference.88 
In contrast, the model’s conclusions will tend not to be critical to 
cases when the use is obviously fair (e.g., a brief quote for educational 
purposes) or obviously unfair (e.g., commercial pirating of identical copies).  
Because evaluation of the traditional factors is one-sided, consent is 
unlikely to be decisive in those contexts. 
                                                                                                                       
do so.  The model presented in this Part will presume no transfer has occurred and use the 
term “author” to refer to the copyright-holding plaintiff, for clarity and because the term 
“author” is less unwieldy than “copyright holder.” 
83 Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); see id. at 594 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“Whether the quotation [in Harper & Row] was an infringement or a fair use . . 
. is a close question that has produced sharp division in both this Court and the Court of 
Appeals.”). 
84 Id. at 542–43. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 579, 590–602 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
87 Id. at 561–68 (O’Connor, J., for the majority). 
88 See infra Part V.D. (analyzing the role of the consent in Harper & Row). 
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i. Stage One:  Prior to the Use  
First, consider the situation prior to the user’s decision to proceed 
with his contemplated use.  At this point, the user may or may not know 
something of the author’s preferences regarding uses of her work.  If there 
is some preexisting relationship between the user and author, the author 
may have already communicated her preferences directly, or implicitly 
through her conduct.  Conversely, there may be no relationship between the 
author and user, in which case the author can communicate her preferences 
only generally through a legend on the work, or—more commonly—not at 
all.89 
The first decision falls to the user:  Should he ask permission of the 
author before making his use?  The benefits of asking permission are 
obvious.  If permission is granted, the user may proceed with the use 
without fear of later litigation, though of course he will have to pay any 
agreed-upon licensing fee.  The decision not to ask permission may be made 
for several reasons.  The user may believe, based on indications from the 
author or otherwise, that the author approves of the use.  The user may have 
a good faith belief that his use is fair, and that therefore no permission from 
the author is needed.  He may not be willing to pay, or be unable to afford, 
the expected licensing fee.  As asking permission alerts the copyright owner 
to the intended use, the user may decline to ask permission in order to avoid 
detection of his potential infringement. 
Importantly, communication costs will enter into the permission-
seeking calculus.  In cases where the user and the author have a preexisting 
relationship, these costs will tend to be low—the time to make a phone call 
or send an email—and thus unlikely to play a significant role in the 
decision.90  In a more typical case, communication costs can be significant, 
                                                
89 Contrary to the older system requiring that a copyright notice—the © symbol—be placed 
on a work in order to claim a copyright, American law no longer requires formalities for a 
work to receive copyright protection.  Instead, all literary works, visual works, musical 
works, and the like are copyrighted automatically once they are “fixed in any tangible 
medium or expression.”  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) & 401(a) (2012).  As a result, a massive 
quantity of expression receives copyrights upon the instant of creation—“every e-mail, 
every note to your spouse, every doodle”—and the vast majority of these are presumably 
bereft of any legend or the like.  See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 137–39 
(2004) (describing expansion in copyright scope due to elimination of formalities such as 
the copyright notice). 
90 Of course, if the user believes the intended use will offend or anger the author, there may 
be costs in alerting the author to the use despite the preexisting relationship.  Indeed, the 
proposed use could sour their relationship.  However, this is not strictly speaking a 
communication cost as I intend to use the term.  The cost incurred is not in the effort of 
communicating itself, but in its secondary effects. 
21
Hickey: Consent, User Reliance, and Fair Use
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
CONSENT, USER RELIANCE, AND FAIR USE 
 
418 
as it can be very difficult to ascertain who the copyright holder is and to 
contact that person.91  In the extreme case, the user may be entirely unable 
to determine the current rightsholder, and permission seeking is a practical 
impossibility.92 
When the author is aware of the intended use, she, too, has a choice 
to make at the pre-use stage:  Should she let the user know that she 
approves or disapproves of the anticipated use?  The decision to announce 
preferences or not may also be made for several reasons.  The author may 
think that her wishes are already clear.  She may not care about the 
anticipated use, and thus have little incentive to say anything.  On the 
strategic side of the ledger, the author may wait to object because her 
bargaining position will be improved after the use is made.  Communication 
costs are, of course, important here as well.  If it is costly to contact the 
user, the author may not get enough benefits—either in deterring unwanted 
uses or in generating licensing revenue from agreed-upon uses—to make it 
worth her while. 
If the user decides to ask permission or the author decides to 
announce her preferences, then some sort of negotiation will ensue.  The 
author may demand a licensing fee for the use, which the user can agree to, 
refuse, or attempt to bargain down.  Or the author’s refusal may be 
categorical:  a refusal to permit the use regardless of the compensation 
offered.  If the negotiation results in an effective agreement, of course, then 
the use is authorized and no fair use case will ensue. 
                                                
91 See Gordon, supra note 19, at 1627–30 (discussing cases where high transaction costs 
create “difficulty achieving a market bargain” and therefore “may justify a grant of fair 
use”). 
92 See Jerry Brito and Bridget Dooling, An Orphan Works Affirmative Defense to Copyright 
Infringement Actions, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 75, 77–81 (2005) (describing 
the “orphans works problem” where the “rightsholder is unknown or cannot be located”). 
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Summary Chart of Consent-Seeking Interactions Model 
Decisionmaker Decision Expected Benefits Expected Costs 
User  To Ask 
Permission 
Avoids risk of 
liability 





Alerts author to use 








User can change 
course 
Figure 1.  This chart summarizes the basic cost-benefit tradeoffs faced by 
authors and users in their consent-seeking interactions. 
ii. Stage Two:  After the Use 
Next, consider the situation after the use is made, i.e., once the user 
has appropriated expression from the original work.  If the author and user 
communicated beforehand, the dynamics of the situation have not changed 
appreciably.  The author is aware of the use, and its potentially infringing 
nature.  As the original negotiation broke down, the remaining decisions are 
whether either party will choose to reopen negotiations, and whether the 
author will bring or threaten suit. 
In the situation where the author and the user have not yet 
communicated, the dynamics are more interesting.  There are three possible 
scenarios.  The first and simplest case is when the author never becomes 
aware of the use.  This may arise intentionally—e.g., when the user’s 
“avoid detection” strategy has succeeded—or unintentionally.  In this 
situation, there will never be any author-user communication, nor any fair 
use suit.  The second possibility is when the author was initially unaware of 
the use, but later gains knowledge of the use.  There, the author never had 
an opportunity to announce her preferences earlier, and the author’s 
decision whether to announce her preferences will take place at this stage.  
The author, however, will now have the additional leverage of threatening 
suit.  
In the third case, the author has been aware of the use all along, but 
declined to announce preferences at stage one.  It is this final category that 
is ripe for strategic behavior by the author.  In particular, the author can “lie 
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in wait” to take advantage of an improved post-use bargaining position.93  
The author has increased negotiating leverage after the use because the user 
can no longer change his course of action.  Before the use is made, the user 
can credibly threaten to make an alternative use (e.g., relying on a different 
work), or to make no use at all (e.g., by excluding the portion that relied on 
the author’s original work).  After the use is made, the user’s only leverage 
is to force the author to sue and to take his chances on a fair use defense.  
Simply by making the new work, the user has already infringed: contrary to 
popular misconception, there is no requirement that the user sell or publish 
the infringing work in order to be liable.94  Indeed, the user is liable for 
heavy statutory damages—up to $150,000 per work infringed—even if his 
use caused little or no actual economic harm to the author.95  Unable to 
change course, and faced with the threat of super-compensatory damages, 
the user has dramatically decreased leverage in a post-use negotiation. 
2. Deterring Strategic Behavior and Ex Post Disputes 
Given this idealized setup, we can now ask the critical question:  
What sorts of consent-seeking interactions do we, as a social matter, wish to 
encourage, and which actions do we wish to discourage? 
Two assumptions necessary for the conclusions that follow should 
be made be made clear at the outset.  First, in order for the benefits of the 
consent factor to be realized, communication costs must be sufficiently low 
such that the costs of communication do not exceed the expected social 
benefits.  Second, the conclusions will presume that the non-consent 
elements of current fair use doctrine work roughly as intended—to wit, to 
                                                
93 The author will have an improved bargaining position in the other cases as well, but only 
in this final case is it a result of her intentional behavior. 
94 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1) & 501(a) (2011); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984). 
95 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)–(2) (2011) (providing that copyright holder may, in lieu of 
proving actual damages, opt to receive statutory damages of $750–$30,000 per work 
infringed, or up to $150,000 per work when the infringement is “willful”).  Even though 
such damages may be orders of magnitude larger than any actual damages suffered by the 
copyright holder, most courts have held that they do not violate due process.  See, e.g., 
Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 17 F.3d 67, 68 (1st Cir. 2013) (award of 
$675,000 in damages for downloading 30 songs does not violate due process).  Moreover, a 
colorable claim of fair use will not necessarily preclude a finding that a defendant’s 
conduct was “willful” for damages purposes.  See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 96 F.2d 301, 313 
(2d Cir. 1992) (characterizing appropriation artist as a willful infringer despite arguable fair 
use claim). 
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permit uses only when doing so is socially beneficial.96  Although the 
assumption is of course artificial, it will enable us to isolate the effects of 
the standard view of consent and the role that consent ought to play in the 
fair use analysis. 
Turning to the conclusions, identifying the first class of cases that 
our fair use law should want to discourage is relatively easy.  At the least, it 
should seek to prevent opportunism by both the author and user.  As used 
here, “opportunism” means strategic, bad faith behavior by an author or 
user.  Specifically, opportunism includes intentional misrepresentations, in 
actions or words, regarding whether one believes a use to be fair or unfair, 
or whether one objects to a use.  In these instances, the argument to 
consider the character of authorial refusal in fair use reduces to the 
economic justifications of equitable doctrines such as laches and unclean 
hands:  “Equity in private law is . . . aimed at preventing opportunism.”97 
An author who could easily object to a known use, but chooses not 
to, may be rightly penalized for a lack of diligence in asserting a claim that 
                                                
96 Although the details of the various accounts differ, there is widespread agreement in the 
economic accounts of fair use law—indeed, of welfare economics more generally—that it 
should operate to maximize net social utility.  See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 19, at 1615, 
1657 (fair use should operate to permit uses when “the market cannot be relied upon to 
allow socially desirable access to, and use of, copyrighted works” and “the use is more 
valuable in the defendant's hands [than in the copyright owner’s]”); William M. Landes & 
Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 358  
(1989) (“Only if the benefits of the use exceed the costs of copyrighted protection . . .  is 
the no right/no liability solution of fair use defensible . . . .”).  On this utilitarian account, 
an ideal fair use law would permit uses when the social value of the use, broadly 
conceived, exceeds its social costs, including downstream effects on authors’ incentives to 
create.  In this sense, fair use is simply a special case of copyright’s overriding goal of 
achieving the ideal balance between providing incentives for authors to create valuable 
works without unduly hindering their dissemination.  See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, 
Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1750–52 (2012). 
Of course, in practice, many doubt that fair use law approaches this ideal.  See, e.g., 
LESSIG, supra note 89, at 187 (“Judges and lawyers tell themselves that fair use provides 
adequate ‘breathing room’ between regulation by the law and the access that the law should 
allow.  But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system has become that anyone 
actually believes this.”); Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 24, at 1485 (“In theory, 
fair use should be a significant limitation on the rights of authors. . . . In reality, however, it 
is more bark than bite: fair use’s ability to shield unauthorized users is greatly undermined 
by the uncertainty that has become the hallmark of the doctrine.”). 
97 See Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law versus Equity, at *3 (2010), available 
at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/HSmith_LawVersusEquity7.pdf, 
(describing equitable doctrines as motivated “by one overriding goal: preventing 
opportunism”). 
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prejudiced the user—much like the equitable doctrine of laches.98  After a 
use is made, the user has little leverage as he is “locked in” to the use, and 
the author can threaten to sue for statutory damages far in excess of any 
actual damages suffered.99  Such a threat would likely deter users even 
when the social value of their planned use exceeds the true costs to the 
author.  In other words, the author’s opportunism creates a social cost.100  
An opportunistic author seeks to exploit the dynamics of the consent-
seeking interaction to extract additional value from users; ex ante, this 
possibility may deter some socially-valuable uses. 
Similarly, a user who avoids asking permission to avoid detection, 
knowing his use to be unfair, invokes the fair use defense with unclean 
hands.101  (Of course, there may be good faith reasons to avoid detection—
for example, when a user honestly believes a use to be fair but simply seeks 
to avoid costly litigation.  This is not “opportunism” as used here, which 
only includes users who believe their uses to be unfair, yet act otherwise.)  
If we assume that current fair use doctrine works as intended to permit uses 
only when they are socially valuable, the possibility of escaping detection 
skews the user’s incentives such that he may engage in socially-harmful 
uses, i.e., uses that cost the author more than the net social benefit.102  One 
way to discourage these opportunistic behaviors is to penalize bad faith 
actors in the fair use analysis.103 
What about failures in communication not attributable to bad faith?  
Preventing opportunism aside, is there any reason to encourage users to ask 
                                                
98 Cf. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961) (“Laches requires proof of (1) 
lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the 
party asserting the defense.”). 
99 See supra note 95; see, e.g., Capital Records v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 901–902 
(8th Cir. 2012) (affirming jury award of $220,000 for engaging in file-sharing of 24 songs). 
100 Accord Smith, supra note 97, at 9–10 (“Opportunism . . . consists of behavior that is 
technically legal but is done with a view to securing unintended benefits from the system, 
and these benefits are usually smaller than the costs they impose on others.”). 
101 Cf. Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1985) (unclean hands 
“requires that those seeking [equity’s] protection shall have acted fairly and without fraud 
or deceit as to the controversy in issue”).   
102 In the absence of transaction costs or externalities, of course, there is no need for the fair 
use doctrine on the standard economic account, as we would expect rightsholders and users 
to agree to license a use if and only if it was socially valuable.  See Gordon, supra note 19, 
at 1613–15 (“An economic justification for depriving a copyright owner of his market 
entitlement exists only when the possibility of consensual bargain has broken down in 
some way.”). 
103 In fact, we see some statements to this effect in the case law.  See, e.g., NXIVM Corp. v. 
Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 478 (2d Cir. 2004) (considering “the propriety of the [user’s] 
conduct” and “bad faith” under the first fair use factor). 
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permission and authors to declare preferences?  One potential reason is that 
early preference-revelation could promote early resolution of disputes and 
deter later fair use litigation.104  Fair use litigation is uncertain and costly.105  
Moreover, there is reason to believe that pre-use negotiation is more likely 
to lead to a resolution—or, at least, not litigation—if the user opts to change 
course.  Because of the author’s disproportionate leverage after the use is 
made, pre-use negotiation will tend to be fairer and more efficient.  Prior to 
use, the author’s ability to threaten a suit for super-compensatory damages 
is more limited, as the user still possesses the effective counter-threat of not 
making the use at all.106  In other words, the pre-use negotiation is, ceteris 
paribus, more likely to reflect the actual social value of the use.107  Thus, in 
the absence of other externalities,108 pre-use negotiation is more likely to 
lead to agreements to make uses only when they are socially beneficial. 
Again, the above arguments hold only if communication costs are 
low.  Whatever benefits there may be to early preference revelation, there 
are also considerable costs.  For users, there are significant costs in 
ascertaining and contacting the rightsholder; for the author, in time lost 
announcing preferences, negotiating with users, or monitoring users for 
possible infringement.  Thus, outside of the bad faith context, failure to ask 
permission or announce preferences should be penalized only when 
communication costs are low due to a preexisting relationship between the 
author and user, the availability of a low cost opt out system, or analogous 
contexts. 
                                                
104 The conclusion that treating consent as a fair use factor will encourage earlier dispute 
resolution is tentative as it will depend on empirical facts about the settlement negotiation 
markets, which may in turn depend on agency problems (when the parties are represented), 
the expected costs of litigation, fee-shifting rules, and the like. 
105 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 89, at 187 (“[F]air use in America simply means the right 
to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create. . . . [Fair use litigation] costs too much, [and] 
delivers too slowly . . . .”); William W. Fisher III et al., Reflections on the Hope Poster 
Case, 25 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 243, 299 (criticizing fair use’s “uncertain and unusually 
fact-specific legal standard that provides no safe harbor for fair use [and] potentially 
crushing litigation and discovery expenses”). 
106 See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. 
107 Cf. Fisher, supra note 105, at 316–17 (“If, after creating their works, [users] seek 
licenses from the owners of the works they have used, the parties will be in a position of 
bilateral monopoly—a situation in which bargaining over a license fee is highly likely to 
break down.”). 
108 In a perfect world, we would hope that the traditional fair use factors operate as intended 
to account for such externalities.  See supra note 96. 
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B. The Equitable Component of Fair Use 
The second argument for consideration of authorial consent draws 
support from the doctrinal basis of fair use as an “equitable rule of 
reason.”109  Fair use is by its nature a wide-ranging, highly contextual 
inquiry.110  As expressed in the legislative history of the fair use provision: 
Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair 
use doctrine over and over again, no real definition of the 
concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an 
equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is 
possible, and each case raising the question must be decided 
on its own facts.111  
Moreover, Congress has made clear that courts deciding fair use cases have 
discretion to consider additional considerations beyond the statutory 
factors.112 
As we have seen in the preceding section, consideration of authorial 
consent and refusal can promote equitable values such as good faith and 
justified reliance.113  If we accept that Congress intended fair use to have an 
equitable component, and that courts have discretion to consider non-
statutory factors, it is difficult to see why the nature of consent should not 
be a factor.  Per Congress’s directive, courts often consider “moral rights” 
such as attribution and distortion in fair use cases.114  Encouraging good 
faith behavior in author-user interactions vindicates similar interests. 
                                                
109 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984) 
(describing fair use as “an ‘equitable rule of reason’ analysis”). 
110 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680. 
111 Id. at 65. 
112 See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text. 
113 See supra Part III.B; see also Precision Co. v. Automotive Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 
(1945) (“[The unclean hands] doctrine is rooted in the historical concept of court of equity 
as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the requirements of conscience and good faith.”); 
A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(“The second element, reliance . . . is essential to equitable estoppel.”). 
114 See, e.g., Williamson v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 2001 WL 1262964, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(“Another relevant consideration within the first of the four fair use factors is the propriety 
of the defendant’s conduct. . . .  In this case, defendants’ work clearly attributes the quoted 
passages to Williamson . . . .”) (citation omitted); Maxtone–Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 
1253, 1261 (2d Cir.1986) (“The commission of errors in borrowing copyrighted material is 
a proper ingredient to consider in making the fair use determination.”). 
28
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 16 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol16/iss2/4
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 397 (2014)  2013-2014  
425 
Some courts and commentators resist this conclusion, however, and 
deny that “good faith” should have any place in the fair use analysis.115  In 
part, this controversy stems from confusing signals sent by the Supreme 
Court.  While the Court implied in Harper & Row that good faith factored 
into the fair use analysis, it later used a footnote in the Campbell decision to 
indicate that the matter remained an open issue. 116 
More fundamentally, however, the debate derives from conflicting 
views of the philosophical basis of copyright law.  On one view, generally 
the dominant understanding of copyright in the American tradition, 
copyright is motivated wholly by a utilitarian calculus to provide incentives 
for the creation of new works.117  Judge Pierre Leval, for example, argues 
that moral considerations such as “good faith” have no place in fair use.118  
Because copyright should be solely concerned with encouraging artistic 
creation, Judge Leval claims that fair use should look only at the use itself, 
not at the conduct of the user:  “The [fair use] inquiry should focus not on 
the morality of the secondary user, but on whether her creation claiming the 
benefits of the doctrine is of the type that should receive those benefits.”119  
If one views copyright law as solely motivated by utilitarian goals, this view 
has some appeal.   
Others, especially in European copyright traditions, believe that 
deontological notions should play a role in animating copyright law.  For 
example, French droit d’auteur, which has been influential in civil law 
intellectual property systems, is usually justified on a natural rights basis 
                                                
115 See, e.g., NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Institute, 364 F.3d 471, 483 (2d Cir. 2004) (Jacobs, J., 
concurring) (“I think that the secondary user’s good or bad faith in gaining access to the 
original copyrighted material ought to have no bearing on the availability of a fair use 
defense.”); Leval, supra note 4, at 1125–28 (arguing that “good faith” should not be 
considered as a fair use factor). 
116 Compare Harper & Row, Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (“Fair 
use presupposes ‘good faith’ and ‘fair dealing’”) (citation omitted) with Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 585 n.18 (1994) (“[R]egardless of the weight one might place 
on the alleged infringer’s state of mind . . . ”). But see NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 483 
(calling the Court’s comment in Harper & Row “a make-weight wholly unnecessary to the 
outcome”) (Jacobs, J., concurring). 
117 Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 
1746 (2012)  (“According to the dominant American theory of intellectual property, 
copyright and patent laws are premised on providing creators with just enough incentive to 
create artistic, scientific, and technological works of value to society by preventing certain 
would-be copiers’ free-riding behavior.”).  This view is sometimes said to be reflected in 
the Constitution, which empowers Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
118 See Leval, supra note 4, at 1126–28. 
119 Id. at 1126. 
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and said to derive from John Locke’s theory of labor as the foundation of 
property.120  Still other copyright theorists look to personhood theory, which 
derives from the Hegelian notion of artistic creation as an aspect of the 
creator’s personality, as the foundation for copyright.121  On these rights-
based views, moral notions of good faith have a more natural role to play in 
copyright. 
The debate between strictly utilitarian views of copyright and its 
alternative bases, however, is well beyond the scope of this Article.  For 
present purposes, it is sufficient to note that there is no reason that both 
consequentialist and deontological notions could not play a role in fair 
use.122  For even if one takes a purely utilitarian view of fair use, 
consideration of consideration of “moral factors” like bad faith may 
promote utilitarian ends.  Consequentialist goals—such as maximizing 
creative output—are not necessarily independent of moral considerations.123  
Indeed, as the preceding section argued, consideration of the author and 
user’s good faith can promote efficient behaviors by users and authors.124  
As a descriptive matter, this view appears to accurately account for how fair 
use analysis is typically conducted.  Courts clearly afford great weight to 
the fourth fair use factor, which is driven by the consequentialist desire to 
maintain the original author’s incentives to create.125  Just as clearly, courts 
                                                
120 See generally Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors’ Rights-Based Copyright Law:  The 
Fairness and Morality of French and American Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 549, 554–55 (2006) (“[I]n civil law countries such as France, the more 
individual-centered droit d’auteur system gives special importance to the principles of 
natural justice . . . .”); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression:  Equality 
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540–
49 (1993) (summarizing the Lockean labor theory and allied approaches to intellectual 
property). 
121 See Fromer, supra note 117, at 1753–54 (overviewing personhood theory); see 
generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). 
122 Jeanne Fromer, for example, recently articulated such a view.  Fromer, supra note 117, 
at 1746 (arguing that utilitarian and moral rights theories of intellectual property “can be 
complementary in important ways because there is a utility to moral-rights concerns”). 
123 Cf. Fromer, supra note 117, at 1746 (arguing that utilitarian and moral rights theories of 
intellectual property “can be complementary in important ways because there is a utility to 
moral-rights concerns”). 
124 See supra Part III.A. 
125 The fourth fair use factor, “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work,” 17 U.S.C. § 107, directly assesses the fair use on a consequentialist 
metric:  does the use serve as a substitute for the original work that undermines the original 
author’s incentive to create?  Indeed, on some economic-based views of fair use, the fourth 
factor is essentially the only consideration, with the other factors merely serving as proxies 
for whether a use is an economic substitute for the original.  See WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 153–54 
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sometimes give weight to moral considerations such as attribution and good 
faith.126 
Thus, at least in the eyes of Congress, fair use is rightly concerned 
with equitable considerations.  It is therefore natural that, in appropriate 
cases, fair use should consider the nature of authorial consent and refusal 
when doing so promotes equitable interests.  Indeed, it may be seen as an 
advantage that fair use, as a flexible judicial inquiry, can incorporate 
litigant-specific factors into its decisionmaking.  In other words, the fair use 
inquiry may be primarily driven by the social value of the use, but it need 
not ignore all other considerations, including the circumstances of the user’s 
failure to obtain consent. 
C. Summary 
In sum, the model of consent-seeking interactions presented above 
implies that consent should be relevant to cases involving user reliance 
interests and strategic behavior.  Both copyright holders and users ought to 
be deterred from acting opportunistically.  In particular, because of the 
“lock in” effect and to vindicate user reliance interests, copyright holders 
should be penalized for failures to object to known uses.  Both conclusions 
gain additional support from fair use’s equitable nature. 
Indeed, it is possible to view the proposed consent consideration less 
as a “new” consent fair use factor, but instead as a recognition that consent 
can sometimes be relevant under the traditional fair use factors.  Bad faith is 
already considered by some courts under the first factor—the purpose of the 
use—and weighs against the bad faith actor.  Similarly, a lack of diligence 
by copyright holders in asserting their rights can be conceptualized under 
the fourth fair use factor.  On this view, silence or acquiescence from a 
copyright holder serves as an indication that there is little or no harm to the 
market for the original work, which weighs in favor of fair use. 
The key point is not the particular doctrinal hook but simply that the 
standard view does not account for important reliance interests.  
Consideration of consent when it would otherwise be relevant in fair use 
can cure that deficiency.  Consent may not be relevant in fair use cases 
involving a simple good-faith refusal, but it has a significant role to play in 
important classes of cases involving user reliance, such as digital 
                                                                                                                       
(2003) (“In general, copying that is complementary to the copyrighted work (in the sense 
that nails are complements of hammers) is fair use, but copying that is a substitute for the 
copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are substitutes for pegs and screws) is not.”) 
126 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985); 
Maxtone–Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1261 (2d Cir.1986); Williamson v. 
Pearson Educ., Inc., 2001 WL 1262964, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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information aggregation systems, orphan works, and “partial consent” from 
the copyright holder. The next two sections will explain the role that 
consent should play in those cases.  
IV. A TYPOLOGY OF CONSENT AND REFUSAL 
This Section expands upon its critique of the standard view by 
developing a typology of the consent-seeking interactions between the 
copyright owner and potential users.  This classification will make the 
Article’s proposed reforms more concrete by examining the various ways 
that a copyright holder may communicate his approval or disapproval, as 
well as his reasons for the same.  In particular, the typology posits that 
consent in this context may be evaluated on two dimensions:  its 
quantitative aspects and qualitative aspects.127  The end goal is to develop a 
precise framework that will subsequently be used to examine the role that 
consent and refusal play in actual fair use cases. 
A. Quantitative Dimension 
The first aspect of the analysis looks to the degree of consent that 
the user has obtained:  How strongly has the copyright holder indicated her 
approval or disapproval?  At one extreme, the case of actual consent, the 
use will always be permitted, whereas a clear refusal will require the typical 
showing that the use is justified under the standard fair use factors. 
Intermediate cases, I argue, should require a lesser fair use showing in order 
to vindicate justified user reliance interests.  Taking the possibilities with 
those most likely to favor fair use first: 
Affirmative Consent.  The copyright holder has expressly assented to 
the use, or otherwise consented in a legally effective manner, such as an 
implied license.128  The fair use defense is not needed, because the use is 
authorized and there is no violation of the copyright holder’s exclusive 
                                                
127 Communication costs loom in the background:  varieties of consent that disfavor fair 
use on this typology should only penalize users or authors when they are not prohibitively 
costly. 
128 Copyright law allows for license implied by conduct only in “narrow circumstances.”  
Estate of Roberto Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2010).  “The test most 
commonly used in determining if an implied license exists with respect to most kinds of 
works asks whether the licensee requested the work, whether the creator made and 
delivered that work, and whether the creator intended that the licensee would copy and 
make use of the work.”  Id. 
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rights in the first instance.129  The use is therefore always permitted, 
regardless of how weak the case for fair use may be on the traditional 
factors.  Opt-in systems where the copyright holder has agreed to participate 
in the use also fall into this category. 
“Partial Consent.”  In this situation, there are implicit indications 
that the copyright holder approved of the use, such as his participation in 
the project or his acquiescence to the use through his conduct.  For various 
reasons, however, this conduct falls short of a legally effective assent.  For 
example, the court may take the common view that an implied license 
requires that the work must be created at the request of the defendant.130  
The facts of Letterese, detailed above,131 offer an example of this situation.  
There, the copyright holder acquiesced in the use for a time, but then 
changed his mind because of a falling out with the user.  Partial consent 
cases should tend to strongly favor fair use because of the significant 
reliance interests of the user.  
Failure to Express Disapproval/Opt Out.  The copyright holder has 
a clear opportunity to refuse to consent to the use, but declines to do so.  In 
the non-digital context, this situation will most commonly arise when the 
copyright holder is aware of the proposed use because of a preexisting 
relationship between the copyright owner and user.  A related case arises in 
the digital context, when a user incorporates a work by default, but provides 
a simple way for copyright holders to “opt out” of participation in that use.  
The facts of the challenge to the Google Books project, explained above,132 
offer an example.  Google includes works in Google Books Search by 
default, but permits rightsholders who object to decline to be included in the 
search results.  When communication costs are low and the copyright holder 
is aware of the option, failure to opt out should tend to favor fair use. 
Silence.  The category of silence captures the common case where 
there has been no direct interaction between the copyright holder and user.  
Often, silence is due to high communication costs.  In some cases, 
particularly when the copyright holder is aware of the use and 
communication costs are not prohibitive, silence ought to favor fair use, as 
it is a signal that there is little market harm from the use.  In other cases, 
                                                
129 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2011) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive 
rights to do and to authorize [particular uses of his work, such as reproductions and 
derivative works.]”) (emphasis added). 
130 See generally PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5.131 (“Courts have held that there cannot be an 
implied license where the work was not created at defendant's request . . . .”). 
131 See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text. 
132 See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text. 
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such as when communication costs are high, silence regarding the use 
should be considered neutral. 
 Partial or Express Refusal.  These categories represent situations 
where the copyright owner has implicitly or explicitly indicated that he does 
not approve the use.  An express refusal is self-explanatory.  Like partial 
consent, partial refusals are “near miss” situations where the copyright 
holder’s indication was somehow ambiguous or ineffective.  Neither 
category should influence the fair use inquiry.  The traditional fair use 
factors are designed for this situation, to identify uses that should be 
permitted in spite of the copyright holder’s refusal.  Thus, an actual refusal 
neither helps nor harms the user—consent simply has no role to play in this 
situation.  Instead, the use should be evaluated on the usual statutory 
factors. 
B. Qualitative Dimension 
A second aspect of the consent analysis is qualitative, and considers 
the motivations of each party underlying the course of action.  What are the 
reasons for the copyright holder’s refusal to give consent and/or the user’s 
failure to obtain it?133  Possibilities include: 
Impossibility.  An extreme case occurs when the user’s failure to 
obtain consent is entirely blocked by practical considerations.  When 
communication costs are very high—cases of so-called “orphan works,” for 
example—the user may be effectively unable to contact the copyright 
holder.134  Impossibility should tend to strongly favor fair use:  because the 
                                                
133 Though it does not explicitly account for it, the standard fair use factors already 
effectively distinguish between a copyright holder’s various reasons for refusal in some 
ways.  In particular, the factors generally favor refusals motivated by simple economic 
reasons (i.e., the license fee offered is not adequate) vis-à-vis those motivated by other 
concerns.  An example of a non-economic refusal would be a refusal to license a use in 
order to avoid criticism, as in the case of refusing to license a parody or an unfavorable 
book review.  In privileging parodies and criticisms, the fair use factors function to disfavor 
refusals motivated by criticism avoidance.  See infra Part I.  The standard economic 
account of fair use yields a similar result.  See generally Gordon, supra note 19 (describing 
account of fair use as justified when a use has externalities or transaction costs impede the 
user-rightsholder negotiation); see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 125, at 149–59 
(justifying parodies, book reviews, and other canonical fair uses on economic bases).  
Economic refusals are favored because they indicate that the copyright holder values 
preventing the use more than the user is willing to pay, which—in the absence of 
externalities—indicates that the use is socially inefficient.  Non-economic refusals, such as 
a refusal to suppress a parody, frequently indicate that there are externalities involved such 
that the copyright holder’s valuation does not reflect the true social benefit of the use. 
134 See infra Part V.C (discussing orphan works cases). 
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user cannot contact the copyright holder, his failure to ask permission 
should not be held against him. 
Strategic Behavior (by the Copyright Holder). When the copyright 
holder is motivated by opportunism, this will tend to strongly favor fair use.  
Opportunism, as used here, means knowing misrepresentations, in actions 
or words, regarding whether one believes a use to be fair or unfair, or 
whether one objects to a use.  In particular, when the copyright holder has 
acquiesced in a use, a later disapproval after the use was made should be 
disfavored as undermining the justified reliance interests of the user.135  Pre-
use silence by the copyright holder specifically intended to create post-use 
leverage should be especially disfavored. 
Good Faith.  In this case, neither the user nor the copyright holder is 
acting opportunistically.  Instead, there is a good faith disagreement about 
whether the use is fair.  Usually, this will correspond to the case of silence 
or express refusal (e.g., the copyright holder makes his preferences known, 
but the user proceeds anyway because of his belief that the use is fair).  
Because neither party is acting strategically, the good faith scenario should 
be considered neutral—that is, consent simply should not be considered at 
all. 
Strategic Behavior (by the User).  The user, believing his use to be 
unfair, avoids asking permission of the copyright holder in order to avoid 
detection of his use.  Such strategic behavior should tend to disfavor fair use 
both because the user is acting in bad faith, and because escaping detection 
may encourage users to engage in socially inefficient uses.136 
Mixed Motives.  It must be acknowledged that the typology 
presented above necessarily simplifies the incredibly-complicated world of 
human motivations.  It is possible, of course, for parties to act “semi-
strategically,” and with multiple or shifting motives.  For example, a user 
may be uncertain about whether his use is fair, and seek to avoid detection 
out of fear of the potential costs of litigation.  Such mixed cases should fall 
somewhere on the spectrum between purely good faith and purely 
opportunistic behavior.  
Timing.  The final element of the qualitative aspects of consent 
looks to timing.  In general, fair use doctrine should privilege earlier actions 
by either party, as they tend to be demonstrative of good faith.  In particular, 
approval or disapproval made prior to the use should be favored, as it gives 
                                                
135 See supra Part III.A (explaining economic rationale for deterring opportunistic 
behavior). 
136 See infra notes 97–103, 109–115 and accompanying text.  Of course, the copyright 
holder’s ability to obtain super-compensatory damages, see 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)–(2) 
(2006), may counteract the user’s ability to escape detection. 
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the user an opportunity to change his course of action before he is “locked 
in” to a particular use.  Privileging earlier preference expression thus 
discourages strategic behavior by copyright holders, who may otherwise opt 
not to reveal their preferences to exploit the lock-in effect.  This, in turn, 
allows the pre-use negotiation to better capture the actual social value of the 
use. 
V. CASE STUDIES 
This Section will apply the above typology to a number of fair use 
fact patterns to explore the influence of the nature of consent and refusal on 
case outcomes.  Building on recent work by Pamela Samuelson and 
Michael Madison, this Section disaggregates the mass of fair use decisions 
to analyze common fact patterns in fair use cases.137  Here, the division 
focuses on commonalities in the consent-seeking interactions of users and 
copyright holders, such as “partial consent” cases or digital opt out systems.  
In particular, this Section examines cases where consent ought to be 
relevant per the model presented in Part III, i.e., those involving user 
reliance interests or strategic behaviors. 
The theme that emerges from the case law is one of confusion—
some courts have followed the black letter law’s standard view and 
neglected the consent consideration, while others have implicitly considered 
the role of consent.  This Section will critique the analysis of the courts in 
the first group, and urge that the nature of consent should be made an 
explicit consideration in some situations. 
A. Opt Out Systems and Information Aggregation 
An obvious area of application is in digital information aggregation 
cases, which have generated a number of important fair use decisions in the 
past decade.138  In these cases, the user seeks to copy a large quantity of 
                                                
137 See Madison, supra note 25, at 1622 (arguing that “the doctrine of fair use might be 
understood more profitably as addressing the intersection of copyright law and social and 
cultural patterns . . . .”); Samuelson, supra note 25, at 2541 (“[F]air use law is both more 
coherent and more predictable than many commentators have perceived once one 
recognizes that fair use cases tend to fall into common patterns, or what this Article will 
call policy-relevant clusters.”). 
138 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146, 1163–68 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(analyzing whether displaying thumbnail versions of photographs in search results is a fair 
use); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817–22 (9th Cir. 2003) (analyzing whether 
displaying thumbnail images in search engine results is a fair use); Internet Archive v. 
Shell, 505 F. Supp. 2d 755, 760–61 (D. Colo. 2007) (describing suit against Internet 
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content in order to make some sort of collective use of that material:  for 
example, to make it digitally accessible, searchable, or otherwise useful in 
ways that the individual works in isolation would not be.  A familiar 
example would be Google Image Search.  To make the images on the 
Internet searchable, Google automatically scans and indexes the visual 
material displayed on websites.139  When an individual types in a query into 
Google’s Image Search, Google displays thumbnail versions of (hopefully) 
relevant images as the search result.140  While such systems are incredibly 
useful, they also draw objections to the unauthorized reproduction of 
copyrighted content on a massive scale. 
In general, the creators of such tools may structure their services in 
three ways:  an opt in, opt out, or a mandatory basis.  An opt-in system only 
incorporates works whose copyright holders have affirmatively agreed to 
participate in the use.141  An opt-out system includes all works in a 
particular category by default—for example, all content made publicly 
available on the Internet—but will exclude any works whose owners 
affirmatively “opt out,” i.e., indicate to the user that they do not wish their 
works to be included.142  Google Image Search, for example, operates on an 
opt out basis:  images on every webpage publicly available on the web are 
included in the search results by default, but website owners may use 
standardized tools to indicate that they do not wish to have their webpages 
indexed, or to have their images displayed.143  A mandatory system includes 
all works by default, and does not provide content owners with any ability 
to opt out.   
On the view of consent advocated herein, fair use should provide 
incentives to structure information-aggregation systems on an opt out basis, 
as opposed to a mandatory basis.144  In terms of the consent typology, opt 
                                                                                                                       
Archive for, inter alia, copyright infringement); Field v. Google, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 
1117–23 (D. Nev. 2006) (analyzing whether Google’s caching of websites is a fair use).  
139 Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1155–56. 
140 Id. 
141 See Sieman, supra note 4, at 887 (defining and explaining features of opt in systems). 
142 See id. at 888–89 (defining and explaining features of opt out systems). 
143 See Remove Content from Google – Completely Remove an Entire Page, GOOGLE.COM, 
https://support.google.com/webmasters/answer/1663419?hl=en (last accessed July 10, 
2014); Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1112–13, 1119. While this “opt out” right is limited to 
website owners who wish to remove their own content from Google, the European Court of 
Justice recently ruled that third parties can sometimes force Google to remove information 
from its search results based on privacy concerns—the so-called “right to be forgotten.”  
See David Streitfeld et al., European Court Lets Users Erase Records on Web, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 14, 2014.  
144 An opt-in system presents no need for a fair use analysis because the user has the 
authorization of each individual rightsholder. 
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out systems are grouped as the “failure to express disapproval” on the 
quantitative dimension, which should favor fair use.  Copyright holders who 
are aware of an opt out, but chose not to take advantage of the option, 
should have a more difficult time defeating a fair use defense in a later suit.  
Such copyright holders should be penalized for not objecting to the use 
when they had the opportunity.  Conversely, users who chose not to provide 
an opt out will need either some persuasive reason for doing so—i.e., a high 
score on the qualitative dimension—or an independently-sufficient case on 
the statutory fair use factors.  
In Field v. Google, discussed earlier,145 Google’s caching 
functionality was held to be a fair use.  Field provides an example of when 
opt out functionality appears to be exerting an influence on a court’s fair use 
analysis.  This is likely because the copyright owner’s conduct in Field was 
particularly egregious:  Field was aware of Google’s caching functionality 
and how to opt out of it, but chose to make his works available online with 
the intent to “manufacture a claim for copyright infringement against 
Google” for profit.146  Though formally irrelevant, the court’s disapproval 
of Field’s conduct appears to influence the analysis.147 
 Other courts, however, have not been as sensitive to the 
significance of opt out functionality.  The two leading cases on search 
engine fair use—Perfect 10 v. Google148 and Kelly v Arriba Soft Corp.149—
both neglect to credit (or even mention) the search engine’s opt out 
structure as a relevant consideration.  Both Perfect 10 and Kelly involved 
whether displaying a website’s copyrighted images in search engine 
results—albeit in a low resolution, “thumbnail” form—was a fair use.  In 
Perfect 10, for example, the operator of an adult website sued Google when 
its copyrighted images were found in Google’s Image Search results.150  
Although the court in Perfect 10 ultimately held that displaying thumbnail 
images in search results was fair, Google’s attempt to accommodate 
competing interests by allowing copyright holders to opt out of indexing 
was neglected in the analysis.151 
                                                
145 See supra notes 71–81 and accompanying text.  
146 Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1113–14. 
147 See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
148 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817–22 (9th Cir. 2003). 
149 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146, 1163–68 (9th Cir. 2007). 
150  Id. at 1157. 
151 See id. at 1168.  In part, this failure may be due to the fact that Perfect 10 had, in fact, 
made efforts to protect its rights by keeping its images on a password-protected website 
accessible only to paid subscribers.  Id. at 1157.  Google respected these wishes and did not 
index the images on Perfect 10’s website; the infringing images appeared in the image 
search results only because third parties had posted unauthorized versions publicly on the 
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AV ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 
2009), provides an example of a case where factoring in the nature of 
consent—which the court did not do—should arguably change the outcome.  
iParadigms operates Turnitin.com, a “plagiarism detection service” that 
maintains a proprietary database of works compiled from the web, print 
sources, and student papers.152  Turnitin.com allows schools who use its 
service to check whether a student’s work was plagiarized by comparing the 
student paper to the material in the database.  After performing this 
comparison, iParadigms “archives” students’ works by copying them into 
its database and using them in future plagiarism checks.153  Several high 
school students who objected to this latter practice—not the plagiarism 
check itself, but the subsequent copying of their works into the database 
without their permission—sued iParadigms for copyright infringement.154 
iParadigms admitted that the elements of copyright infringement 
were met, but claimed fair use as a defense.155  The Fourth Circuit 
concluded that the use was fair, relying in part on decisions like Perfect 
10.156  And, indeed, the case for fair use in iParadigms under the four 
statutory factors is similar to the arguments that prevailed in Field and 
Perfect 10.  Like those cases, iParadigms copies the entirety of the work for 
a commercial purpose, but its use is transformative because it serves an 
“entirely different function and purpose than the original works.”157   
                                                                                                                       
Internet.  Id.  Nonetheless, Google’s attempt to respect Perfect 10’s wishes—albeit 
ineffectively in the event due to third party pirates—might still have been considered to 
weigh in its favor in the fair use analysis. 
152 A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, 562 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2009). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 635. 
155 iParadigms also asserted that its use was authorized because the students had to click a 
box agreeing to iParadigms’ “terms and conditions” when they submitted their papers.  Id. 
at 635–36.  There was a substantial question as to whether this agreement was enforceable, 
however, because the students were minors at public high schools that had to submit their 
papers to Turnitin.com in order to receive school credit.  See AV v. iParadigms, Ltd. 
Liability Co., 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481–82 (E.D. Va. 2008) (addressing these issues but 
finding the agreement enforceable).  The Fourth Circuit did not decide whether the 
agreement was enforceable because it concluded that iParadigms’ use was fair in any event. 
See iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 645 n.8. 
156 See id. at 639 (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007), to 
support notion that iParadigms’ use is transformative).  
157 Id. at 639.  Compare id. at 638–40 (“iParadigms' use of plaintiffs' works had an entirely 
different function and purpose than the original works; the fact that there was no 
substantive alteration to the works does not preclude the use from being transformative in 
nature.”) with Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165 (“The fact that Google incorporates the entire 
Perfect 10 image into the search engine results does not diminish the transformative nature 
of Google's use.”). 
39
Hickey: Consent, User Reliance, and Fair Use
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
CONSENT, USER RELIANCE, AND FAIR USE 
 
436 
Neglected in the court’s analysis was the fact that iParadigms, unlike 
the search engines at issue in Field and Perfect 10, structures its database on 
a mandatory basis.  All student submissions are included by default, and 
individual students who object to the practice—like the plaintiffs in 
iParadigms—cannot opt out of inclusion.158  Indeed, because of the formal 
irrelevance of consent, iParadigms never had to explain why it could not 
accommodate dissenting students through a simple opt-out mechanism. 
All this is not to say that all digital information aggregation and 
information access systems must, as a matter of fair use law, be structured 
on an opt out basis.  If a system has a compelling case on the traditional fair 
use factors or strong qualitative reasons for the mandatory structure, the 
failure to provide an opt out may be justified.  The Internet Archive’s 
Wayback Machine, which archives and permanently preserves much of the 
Internet’s content for historical purposes, offers a potential example.159  The 
Wayback Machine, like Google’s cache system, has been threatened with 
suit for copyright infringement.160  In actual practice, the Wayback Machine 
will remove material at the request of website owners,161 but it may have a 
persuasive reason for a mandatory structure.  Because the Internet Archive 
seeks to serve as an historical “resource for future generations,”162 it could 
argue that allowing individual website owners to opt out would bias the 
historical record.  The point is not that the consent factor will operate the 
same way in every case, but merely that by failing to consider it, courts are 
ignoring important interests in their fair use analyses. 
                                                
158 iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 635 (“Using the passwords provided by the schools [the high 
school student plaintiffs] submitted their papers, each of which included a ‘disclaimer’ 
objecting to the archiving of their works . . . however, each of these submissions was 
archived.”).  iParadigms, interestingly, did allow schools to opt of archiving student works, 
although this was of little use to the actual student authors.  See id. at 634. 
159 See About the Wayback Machine, INTERNET ARCHIVE, https://archive.org/about/ (last 
accessed July 10, 2014). 
160 Internet Archive v. Shell, 505 F. Supp. 2d 755, 760 (D. Colo. 2007).  The case was 
eventually settled without a determination of the fair use issue.  See Brewster, Internet 
Archive and Suzanne Shell Settle Lawsuit (Apr. 25, 2007, 12:25 PM), 
http://archive.org/post/119669/lawsuit-settled. 
161 See Internet Archive v. Shell, 505 F. Supp. 2d 755, 760 (D. Colo. 2007) (“Neither the 
Wayback Machine nor Internet Archive actively seek the permission of website owners 
prior to reproducing website content, but according to Internet Archive, the Internet 
Archive website explains how website owners can remove material from the archive”); see 
also Removing Documents From the Wayback Machine, INTERNET ARCHIVE, 
http://archive.org/about/exclude.php (last accessed July 10, 2014) (“The Internet Archive is 
not interested in offering access to web sites or other Internet documents whose authors 
who do not want their materials in the collection. To remove your site from the Wayback 
Machine, place a robots.txt file at the top level of your site . . . .”). 
162 See Internet Archive, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 760. 
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B. Partial Consent and User Reliance Interests 
Another type of case where consent should play a significant role is 
in situations of “partial consent,” such as the Letterese case.  Recall that in 
Letterese, the Church of Scientology had used aspects of a work, with the 
apparent permission of the author and rightsholder, for decades.163  After a 
falling out with the rightsholder—whom the Church had 
excommunicated—the Church was sued for copyright infringement, but it 
successfully argued that its use was fair in the district court.164  Under the 
consent theory developed in this Article, the longstanding acquiescence to 
the use by the rightsholder ought to weigh in favor of fair use because of the 
reliance interests that his conduct created.165  The Eleventh Circuit, 
however, expressly disregarded the implied consent consideration in 
overruling the district court’s fair use holding.166  This Article’s analysis 
suggests that the Eleventh Circuit’s approach in Letterese was misguided. 
A similar approach was taken in another fair use case involving a 
religious dispute, Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God 
(“WCG”).167  The WCG case grew out of a doctrinal dispute between the 
World Church of God (WCG) and the Philadelphia Church of God (PCG).  
The WCG’s founder, Herbert Armstrong, led the church for decades.168  
Toward the end of his life, Armstrong wrote a book called Mystery of the 
Ages (the “Mystery”); the WCG, in its religious mission, distributed over 9 
million free copies of the Mystery.169  After Armstrong’s death, however, 
the church splintered:  while the mainstream WCG renounced many of 
Armstrong’s teachings and the Mystery in particular, the PCG broke away 
to form a rival sect that still revered Armstrong’s book as a “divinely 
inspired text.”170  
The WCG, however, still held the copyright in the Mystery.  
Because WCG believed it had a “Christian duty” to suppress Armstrong’s 
“heretical” book, it destroyed the copies of the book in its possession and 
ceased any printing or distribution the Mystery.171  The PCG relied on 
                                                
163 Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology, 533 F.3d 1297, 1308 (11th Cir. 
2008). 
164 Id. at 1295–98.  
165 Of course, the usual statutory factors must present at least a reasonable argument for fair 
use in order for this consent factor to be determinative.  
166 Id. at 1308. 
167 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000). 
168 Id. at 1113. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 1122 (Brunetti, J., dissenting). 
171 Id. 
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existing copies of the Mystery for a time, but, as those deteriorated, it began 
making new copies for its own religious use beginning 8 years after its split 
with WCG.172  WCG then sued for infringement of its copyright, and PCG 
asserted a fair use defense.173  Analyzing the four statutory factors, WCG 
presents a close case:  on the one hand, PCG’s use is for a noncommercial 
religious purpose, and the market harm to WCG is nonexistent.  On the 
other hand, PCG’s copying is wholesale and non-transformative.  As a 
result, the district court ruled that the use was fair, but the Circuit panel split 
2-1 against fair use.174   
In such a close case, the consent factor can make the difference, and 
in WCG, it should swing the decision in favor of fair use.  PCG has 
powerful consent-based arguments in its favor:  prior to Armstrong’s death, 
WCG held out the work as available for religious use and encouraged that 
use by distributing millions of copies of the Mystery for free.  On the 
quantitative dimension, this is a partial consent situation, where the user 
should be entitled to rely on the prior conduct of the author evincing 
permission of a use.  Furthermore, PCG has no effective way to make its 
use of the work through negotiation:  the Mystery had been out of print for 
decades and was almost certain to remain so.  The Circuit court, however, 
adhered to the standard view and discounted these considerations.175 
A final example of a partial consent case tending to favor fair use is 
Estate of Martin Luther King v. CBS, Inc., a copyright dispute over Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s famous “I Have a Dream” speech.176  CBS, as part 
of a historical documentary entitled “The 20th Century with Mike Wallace,” 
used film of Dr. King’s 1963 speech that CBS reporters had shot and 
broadcast in their news coverage at the time.177  Dr. King’s estate sued for 
copyright infringement; as a defense, CBS asserted that the copyright was 
invalid and that its use was, in any event, fair.178 
  These facts provide another example of how consent can inform 
the fair use analysis.  In addition to CBS’s arguments under the standard 
fair use factors, CBS could argue that Dr. King’s and the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference’s actions—which directly encouraged the speech to 
                                                
172 Id. at 1113. 
173 Id. at 1113–14. 
174 See id. at 1114, 1122–25 (Brunetti, J., dissenting). 
175 See id. at 1115, 1119 (rejecting “PCG's claim of fair use based on WCG's withdrawal of 
[the Mystery] from distribution” and noting that WCG has “the right to change [its] 
mind.”). 
176 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999). 
177 Id. at 1213. 
178 See In re Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 
1349 (N.D. Ga. 2002). 
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be filmed, broadcast, and disseminated—weigh in favor of fair use.  Indeed, 
wide public dissemination was a large part of the political motivation of the 
Speech:  “The SCLC had sought out wide press coverage of the March [on 
Washington] and the [“I Have a Dream”] Speech, and these efforts were 
successful; the Speech . . . was extensively covered on television and radio 
subsequent to the live broadcast.”179  In this case, consent should therefore 
favor fair use because CBS’s film was originally made not only with the 
author’s permission, but with his encouragement.180 
C. Impossibility and Orphan Works   
“Orphan works” describe copyrighted material whose “owner 
cannot be identified and located by someone who wishes to make use of the 
work.”181  Changes to U.S. copyright law over the past several decades, 
mostly motivated by compliance with international agreements such as the 
Berne Convention, have combined to dramatically increase the number of 
orphan works.  The first change was the elimination of copyright 
formalities—such as registration with the Library of Congress and marking 
the work with ©—as a prerequisite to copyright protection.182  Copyright 
now attaches automatically to an original work once it is written, which 
greatly increases the number of copyrighted works.183  Moreover, it is no 
longer possible to tell from the face of a work whether it claims copyright 
protection.  The second change was the elimination of the copyright 
renewal requirement.  Previously, copyright owners needed to actively 
renew their copyrights after 28 years,184 and the vast majority of 
                                                
179 Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
180 Because of the posture of the case, the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling addressed only whether 
Dr. King had made a “general publication” of the speech (and thus thrust it into the public 
domain); the case settled before a ruling on CBS’s fair use claim.  See id. at 1356 
(“[Following the Eleventh Circuit’s reversal on the general publication issue,] the parties 
entered into settlement negotiations and stipulated to the dismissal of plaintiff's action with 
prejudice on July 12, 2000.”). 
181 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 1 (2006). 
182 See id. at 3; Christopher Sprigman, Reform(al)izing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 
494 (2004). 
183 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”); see also supra note 89. 
184 Libby Greisman, The Greatest Book You Will Never Read:  Public Access Rights and 
the Orphan Works Dilemma, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 193, 198–99 (2012); U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 3 (2006). 
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copyrighted works fell into the public domain at that stage.185  Finally, the 
term of copyright duration has been greatly extended, from an initial 28-
year term (with an optional 28 year renewal term) under the 1909 Copyright 
Act to today’s “virtually perpetual” term:  the life of the author plus 70 
additional years.186  These changes vastly shrank the size of the public 
domain, creating a large category of older works that are no longer 
economically valuable, but nonetheless still protected by copyright. 
The orphan works phenomenon creates significant social costs.  As a 
practical matter, there is no way for potential users of orphan works to get 
permission from copyright holders, yet no guarantee that an owner will not 
emerge later and claim statutory damages of up to $150,000 per work 
infringed.187  This risk of liability deters potential users from making many 
socially-beneficial uses—such as new derivative works, preservation of 
decaying older works, or digitization of historical material—that cause little 
or no actual harm to copyright holders.188  The orphan works problem is not 
merely theoretical—real-life examples abound.189 
Legislative solutions, such as the return of copyright formalities, or 
a limitation on liability when a reasonably diligent search for the copyright 
owner was made, offer one solution to the orphan works problem.190  In the 
absence of legislation, however, courts must confront whether uses of 
orphan works are fair, and consideration of the nature of consent has much 
to offer to that analysis.   
One example is the litigation against HathiTrust, a partnership 
among a number of leading research universities to create a centralized 
database of digital versions of the works in their collections.191  Among 
                                                
185 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 125, at 234–37 (presenting data showing that 
rightsholder declined to renew the vast majority—78%–97%, depending on the year—of 
registered works).  
186 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194–96 (2003); id. at 203 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
187 See REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 181, at 1–4; 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)–(2) 
(2011). 
188 See Brito & Dooling, supra note 92, at 84–86 (describing costs of the orphan works 
problem); REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 181, at 7 (“The orphan works problem 
is real.”). 
189 See REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 181, at 23–34 (describing productive uses 
of orphan works deterred by the current legal structure).  
190 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 89, at 248–53 (proposing reintroduction of renewal 
requirement); Sprigman, supra note 182, at 555–56 (proposing voluntary renewal system); 
REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 181, at 8, 127 (proposing limitation on remedies 
when user cannot identify or locate copyright holder after a diligent search). 
191 See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, __ F.3d __, No. 12-4547-cv, 2014 WL 2576342, 
at *1 (2d Cir. June 10, 2014), aff’g 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also 
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other things, HathiTrust Digital Library provides full public access to 
millions of public domain works.192  Other features of HathiTrust—
including the systematic digitization of in-copyright works—resulted in 
copyright infringement litigation by the Authors’ Guild.193  Many aspects of 
the HathiTrust Digital Library project—including digitization for 
preservation purposes and enabling print-disabled access—have been held 
to be fair.194  The challenge to HathiTrust’s Orphan Works Project (OWP), 
however, has not yet been resolved.195 
The details of HathiTrust’s OWP are in the process of being 
reformulated, and the project may not ultimately be revived.196 The original 
proposed system, however, worked roughly as follows.  The libraries would 
identify works in their collections that are no longer commercially 
available, and make an attempt to contact the copyright holder.197  If the 
copyright holder could not be located, HathiTrust would list the book as an 
“Orphan Candidate” on its website for 90 days.  If the copyright holder still 
did not contact HathiTrust, a digital version of the orphan work would be 
made available online to authorized library users—university students and 
professors—with the number of simultaneous uses not to exceed the 
number of physical copies in the library’s collection.198 
On the traditional fair use factors, the OWP has a strong but not 
overwhelming case.199  While the use is made for nonprofit educational 
purposes and market harm is slight, the OWP creates wholesale, non-
transformative copies of the original works.  The consent consideration may 
aid HathiTrust’s argument, depending on how the OWP is eventually 
structured.  If HathiTrust makes a reasonably diligent effort to contact 
orphan works’ rightsholders, and gives them a reasonable opportunity to 
                                                                                                                       
Our Partnership, HATHITRUST, http://www.HathiTrust.org/partnership (last accessed July 
10, 2014). 
192 See James Aaron, The Authors Guild v. HathiTrust:  A Way Forward for Digital Access 
to Neglected Works in Libraries, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2012). 
193 See HathiTrust, 2014 WL 2576342, at *1–*2. 
194 Id. at *7–*13. 
195 See id. at *14–*15 (finding that Authors’ Guild’s challenge to HathiTrust’s OWP was 
not yet ripe because the OWP had yet to be implemented and may not even be revived). 
196 See id. at *14–*15; Orphan Works Project, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LIBRARY, 
http://www.lib.umich.edu/orphan-works (Feb. 17, 2014); Statement on the Orphan Works 
Project, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LIBRARY, http://www.lib.umich.edu/news/u-m-library-
statement-orphan-works-project (Sept. 16, 2011). 
197 See HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
198 Id. 
199 See Aaron, supra note 192, at 1335 (analyzing OWP under the statutory fair use factors 
and concluding “HathiTrust may be able to prevail, but this is far too uncertain”). 
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initially object and opt out at any time, the rightsholder’s inaction may be 
treated as an implied consent that should favor fair use. 
D. “Purloined” Copies and Bad Faith 
Another class of cases in which consent may play a critical role are 
those involving strategic behaviors.  A commonly-occurring example is the 
scenario when the user has obtained his copy of the original work through 
unauthorized means.  Under the framework outlined in this Article, bad 
faith conduct in obtaining the work should weigh against fair use—although 
not, as some courts have held, in a dispositive fashion.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Harper & Row, outlined above,200 
provides an example.  Under the traditional four use factors, the use in 
Harper & Row presents a debatable case, with the first and third factors 
favoring fair use, and the second and fourth factors cutting against it.  The 
user’s conduct in Harper & Row, while not illegal, was at the least 
unsavory:  The trial court found that “The Nation knowingly exploited a 
purloined manuscript” that it received from an anonymous source.201  The 
majority found that this conduct weighed against fair use under the first 
factor.202  Justice Brennan’s dissent, although agreeing that bad faith can be 
relevant, accuses the majority of making too much of this “putative bad 
faith,” maintaining that it “prejudices the [fair use] inquiry.”203  To be sure, 
courts should be careful not let either party’s bad faith influence their 
analysis of the other factors.  However, even the dissent acknowledged that 
the case was “close” on the traditional fair use factors.204  Thus, it seems 
that the user’s bad faith conduct may have made the difference in Harper & 
Row, and rightly so. 
In the Campbell decision, the Supreme Court used a footnote to 
walk back its apparent holding in Harper & Row that good faith was 
relevant to fair use.205  Following the Campbell decision, whether bad faith 
conduct by the user should be a factor in the fair use analysis is an active 
issue that has caused division in the lower courts.206  The debate between 
                                                
200 See supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text. 
201 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563. 
202 Id. at 562. 
203 Id. at 593–94 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
204 Id. at 594. 
205 Compare id. at 562 (“Fair use presupposes good faith and fair dealing.”) (quotations 
omitted) with Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 n.18 (1994) 
(“[R]egardless of the weight one might place on the alleged infringer's state of mind . . . .”). 
206 See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 262 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (2d Cir. 2006) 
(describing a “contentious battle over the role of good faith in the post-Campbell fair use 
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Judges Walker and Jacobs in NXIVM Corporation v. Ross Institute 
illustrates the controversy over bad faith’s role in fair use.207  NXIVM was 
in the business of selling to subscribers “an exclusive and expensive 
seminar training program known as ‘Executive Success.’”208  The user, 
Rick Ross, obtained a copy of NXIVM’s unpublished training manual, 
which was kept highly confidential, and quoted from it in an online exposé 
of NXIVM.209  Because Ross’s work was a transformative criticism, the 
Second Circuit rightly found the use fair, even assuming bad faith by Ross 
in obtaining the manual.210  The majority considered itself bound by Harper 
& Row to treat bad faith as a factor, but it did not consider it dispositive, 
given that the usual considerations weighed strongly in favor of fair use.211  
This Article’s framework yields the same result—Ross’s conduct lies 
somewhere between pure good faith and true opportunism on the qualitative 
dimension of consent, but his case on the traditional fair use factors is 
overwhelming. 
In a concurrence, Judge Jacobs agreed with the result but rejected 
the notion that bad faith should ever be a factor in fair use.  He asserted that 
Harper & Row’s intimations about good faith were made only “in passing” 
and that Campbell had “reopened the question.”212  Judge Jacobs then 
argued that bad faith should be irrelevant because fair use ought to be 
motivated solely by “the utilitarian goals of copyright” to “encourage[] 
creative output.”213  Accordingly, fair use should concern itself only with 
whether a use is transformative, or instead usurps the market for the 
original.  Citing Judge Leval’s views, Judge Jacobs claims that “[t]he bad 
faith of the secondary user in gaining access to the original author’s 
material has no rational bearing on those . . . inquiries.”214   
As to both precedent and policy, Judge Jacobs’s view is not 
persuasive.  As to precedent, it is not convincing to claim that Harper & 
                                                                                                                       
inquiry”); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 483–86 (2d Cir. 2004) (Jacobs, J., 
concurring) (criticizing majority’s reliance on the defendant’s bad faith and arguing that 
bad faith has no role in fair use inquiry). 
207 364 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004). 
208 Id. at 475. 
209 Id. at 475–76.  The concurrence recalled the matter colorfully.  Id. at 486 (Jacobs, J., 
concurring) (“Dr. Ross and his co-defendants quoted from NXIVM’s manual to show that 
it [was] the pretentious nonsense of a cult.”).   
210 Id. at 478–79. 
211 Id.  
212 Id. at 484 (Jacobs, J., concurring). 
213 Id. at 485. 
214 Id. (citing Leval, supra note 4, at 1126).  See also supra notes 118–19 and 
accompanying text (explaining Judge Leval’s argument that good faith should be irrelevant 
to fair use). 
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Row’s statements on bad faith should be discounted because it “was not a 
close case”215—a statement that ignores the strong dissent of Justice 
Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and White.  More importantly, even 
accepting the premise that copyright should be motivated only by the 
utilitarian end of maximizing creative output, Judge Jacobs’s view ignores 
the possibility that consideration of “moral factors” such as bad faith can 
promote utilitarian goals.  In other words, moral factors and utilitarian ends 
are not necessarily independent.216  As this Article has argued, 
consideration of the author and user’s good faith can promote efficient 
behavior.217  The underlying problem may be Judge Jacobs’s apparent 
assumption that bad faith can only cut against users.218  As shown above, 
there are a number of situations where the copyright holder’s bad faith 
conduct—such as failing to announce preferences at the pre-use stage, or 
knowingly failing to opt out of a use—should cut in favor of fair use. 
It is of course possible, as Justice Brennan warned, to mistake bad 
faith as the sole fair use factor, and some courts have succumbed to that 
temptation.  For example, the Federal Circuit in Atari Games Corp. v. 
Nintendo of Am. Inc. relied on Harper & Row to hold that “[t]o invoke the 
fair use exception, an individual must possess an authorized copy of a 
literary work.”219  Atari is a maker of video games, and, in order to produce 
games that were compatible with Nintendo’s NES platform, Atari 
fraudulently obtained a copy of the security code from the Copyright 
Office, and used it to “unlock” the NES.220  The Federal Circuit’s per se 
rule prohibiting fair use in this context is no longer good law after 
Campbell, and the rule was wrong as a normative matter even at the time 
Atari was decided.  Although Atari’s conduct was hardly admirable, it had a 
very strong case on the other fair use factors: the use was for a privileged 
purpose (the copying was driven by functional “research” concerns), the 
work was factual, and the resulting economic effect did not supersede the 
original’s market (other than in the ordinary competitive sense).  Indeed, 
several courts subsequently found that the “reverse engineering” at issue in 
                                                
215 See id. at 484.   
216 Cf. Fromer, supra note 117, at 1746 (arguing that utilitarian and moral rights theories of 
intellectual property “can be complementary in important ways because there is a utility to 
moral-rights concerns”). 
217 See supra Part III.A. 
218 See 364 F.3d at 485 (“[Copyright’s] goals are not advanced if bad faith can defeat a fair 
use defense.”). 
219 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
220 Id. at 836. 
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Atari should be a fair use.221  The better rule is to judge reverse engineering 
under the usual factors—which will permit fair use in most cases—while 
not ignoring the bad faith factor entirely. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that a mere failure to ask 
permission, when based on a good faith belief that a use is fair, should not 
count against the user.  For example, in Blanch v. Koons, a work of Jeff 
Koons’s “appropriation art” that copied images from Allure magazine was 
held to be fair.222  The court rightly rejected the suggestion that Koons 
failure to ask advance permission to use the images evinced bad faith.223  
When a user believes his use to be fair, as Koons did, there is no bad faith in 
not seeking permission.  Such conduct should not weigh against fair use.224 
Thus, though trial and error, some courts have eventually gotten it 
right in treating bad faith as a nondispositive consideration under the first 
fair use factor.  Bad faith need not be ignored, but there is also no reason 
that it should trump all other fair use considerations. 
VI. COSTS AND CONCERNS 
This Part will anticipate and address criticisms of this Article’s 
proposal to consider consent as a fair use factor in a limited class of cases.  
While there are potential costs associated with the proposal, this Part will 
argue that the benefits outweigh those costs. 
A.  Unpredictability in Application 
One potential cost of the proposed consent consideration is that it 
will make fair use law yet more indeterminate and unpredictable.  Fair use 
is frequently derided for creating uncertainty through an unpredictable, 
multi-factor test.225  Adding another consideration would not seem to help 
                                                
221 See Lexmark Int’l., Inc. v. Static Control Components, 387 F.3d 522, 544–45 (6th Cir. 
2004) (noting that the first, second, and fourth factors favored fair use in reverse 
engineering case); see id. at 551 (Merritt, J., concurring) (“[the reverse engineering] use of 
the program in this case appears to fall under the fair use exception”); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. 
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522–28 (9th Cir. 1992). 
222 467 F.3d 244, 246–48 (2d Cir. 2006). 
223 Id. at 255–56. 
224 See supra Part IV.B. (explaining why consent should be neutral in the situation when 
neither party acts strategically). 
225 See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 
1271, 1284  (2008) (“Fair use therefore remains fairly unpredictable and uncertain in many 
settings.”); Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 24, at 1485–86 (“[T]he case law is 
characterized by widely divergent interpretations of fair use, divided courts, and frequent 
reversals. . . . . [T]he ambiguity of the fair use doctrine works as a one-ratchet that will in 
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matters.  However, in practice, analyzing consent when it is relevant to the 
traditional fair use factors will not contribute much new uncertainty to the 
fair use inquiry.  In many fair use cases—such as those involving a clear 
good-faith refusal by the copyright holder—consent will not be relevant, 
and therefore will not create any new uncertainty.  In any event, some 
uncertainty is the price of Congress’s intention that fair use be a context-
specific determination. 
Despite the criticism from some quarters, it is easy to overstate the 
unpredictability of fair use.  Several commentators have recently made the 
case that, when properly analyzed, fair use doctrine is not nearly as 
unpredictable as is often claimed.226  Many fair uses—such as quotations, 
parodies, criticism, and reverse engineering—are so widely accepted that, in 
most cases, it is clear that a use is fair even without an explicit rule.227  A 
more persuasive critique of the practical application of fair use may be that 
resource asymmetries between rightsholders and users can frustrate the 
vindication of fair use rights.228 The real problem, on that view, is the high 
cost of litigation, not the uncertainty of the doctrine. 
Even assuming that current fair use doctrine is too unpredictable, it 
must be borne in mind that this indeterminacy is mostly by design.  
Congress intended fair use to be a contextual, “case-by-case” 
determination.229  Part of the price of having a flexible fair use doctrine is 
some uncertainty in outcome.  The countervailing benefit, of course, is that 
fair use law is free to develop—e.g., by privileging “transformative” uses—
                                                                                                                       
many cases lead to the underuse of copyrighted works.”); LESSIG, supra note 89, at 187 
(“[F]air use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer . . . .”). 
226 See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 25, at 2541 (“[F]air use law is both more coherent and 
more predictable than many commentators have perceived once one recognizes that fair use 
cases tend to fall into common patterns. . . .”); Sag, supra note 49, at 85 (finding 
“considerable evidence against the oft-repeated assertion that fair use adjudication is 
blighted by unpredictability and doctrinal incoherence”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making 
Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 717 (2011) (“Recently, three leading 
scholars have produced empirical studies that actually find some order in fair use case law . 
. . .”). 
227 See Madison, supra note 25, at 1647–59 (describing these generally accepted fair uses); 
cf. Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 24, at 1502 (arguing for explicit per se rules to 
promote certainty in fair use). 
228 See Fisher, supra note 105, at 312 (“[A] large corporation with a relatively weak 
copyright case usually will have the litigation advantage against a smaller litigant, even 
when the smaller litigant has a strong [fair use] case.”); LESSIG, supra note 89, at 187. 
229 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) (“[T]he courts must be free to adapt the [fair 
use] doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”). 
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and to adapt to new technologies like search engines.230 Indeed, if fair use is 
already unpredictable, adding a new consideration to fair use in a limited set 
of situations should not contribute much new uncertainty at the margin.  
Furthermore, as the case studies above show, it is fairly easy to evaluate 
which way consent will cut in a given case.231  In sum, while uncertainty is 
a cost to this Article’s proposal, it is not a significant one. 
B. Judicial and Evidentiary Costs 
Another cost associated with this Article’s proposal relates to its 
practical implementation.  Many of the inquiries relevant to the nature of 
consent—especially on the quantitative dimension—will be straightforward 
factual matters.  For example, determining whether a digital system 
provides an opt out, whether a user requested permission, or whether a 
copyright holder had an opportunity to make a pre-use refusal do not 
present particularly difficult issues of proof.  However, the consent 
determination will sometimes turn on tricky questions of intent, which may 
create some evidentiary costs.  In any case, consent is another issue that 
parties may seek discovery on, and that judges must rule upon in those 
cases litigated to a decision.  These determinations are not costless. 
Evidentiary issues are a particular concern in evaluating the 
qualitative dimension of consent, as this may require evaluating the state of 
mind of the user or copyright holder.  Determining subjective intent is often 
said to create difficult problems of proof.232  These problems, however, are 
not intractable.233  The parties in litigation have many traditional discovery 
tools, such as depositions, that can be effective at sorting out the truth of 
these matters.234  As to the judicial determination, much of the qualitative 
consent inquiry tracks traditional equitable questions—were the parties 
                                                
230 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994) (establishing the 
“transformative” nature of a use as a key part of the first fair use factor); Kelly v. Arriba 
Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817–22 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding Google Image Search a fair use). 
231 See supra Part V. 
232 See, e.g., D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers:  Basing Disparate 
Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 773–75 (1987) 
(discussing difficulties of proving intent in discrimination cases); Nathan S. Richards, 
Judicial Resolution of EMTALA Screening Claims at Summary Judgment, 87 N.Y.U.  L. 
REV. 591, 620 (2012) (“[P]roving intent is notoriously difficult.”). 
233 To take only the most obvious example, proof of ill intent (mens rea) is nearly always 
required to obtain any criminal conviction.  See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1), 
General Requirements for Culpability (“Except as provided in Section 2.05, a person is not 
guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the 
law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.”). 
234 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 27 (depositions), 33 (interrogatories), 34 (document discovery).  
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acting in good faith?—in which courts have considerable experience and 
competence.  In short, there is no reason to believe that determining intent 
will be more difficult in fair use cases than in any other case in which state 
of mind is in issue. 
The recent litigation between the Associated Press (“AP”) and 
Shepard Fairey provides an example of how discovery can effectively ferret 
out bad faith actors in fair use cases.  In 2008, Fairey, a graphic artist, 
created the well-known “Hope Poster,” which depicts President Obama in 
red, white, and blue with the word “HOPE” running across the bottom.235  
Fairey relied on an AP photograph of Obama, which he downloaded from 
the Internet, as a starting point for the poster.236  When the AP discovered 
this use, it demanded compensation from Fairey; Fairey responded by filing 
suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that his use was fair.237  Fairey’s 
complaint asserted that he used a different photo (also owned by AP) as his 
source material.238  Fairey claims that this assertion was initially a mistake; 
rather than admitting his error, however, Fairey lied to the court about the 
true source photo, destroyed evidence, and submitted fabricated evidence to 
support his lie.239  This conduct came to light in the course of litigation, and 
led to a later settlement of the fair use case and contempt charges against 
Fairey.240  The Fairey case illustrates that the usual features of adversarial 
civil litigation are capable of uncovering bad faith behavior by copyright 
owners and users. 
C. Inhibiting “Tolerated Uses” 
A common concern with consideration of consent as a fair use factor 
relates to the potential ex ante behavioral responses from copyright holders.  
In particular, one may worry that the proposal creates an incentive for 
copyright owners to mark their works with restrictive legends intended to 
broadly disclaim uses of their material.  At the extreme, one can imagine 
rightsholders attaching preemptive boilerplate to all works in order to 
                                                
235 See generally Fisher, supra note 105, at 249–53 (describing creation of the Hope 
Poster); see also id. at 327 fig.1 (image of the poster). 
236 Id. at 249–50. 
237 See Complaint, Fairey v. The Assoc. Press, No. 09 Civ. 01123 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009), 
2009 WL 319564. 
238 See id. at 8. 
239 See Liz Robbins, Artist Admits Using Other Photo for ‘Hope’ Poster, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
18, 2009; Fisher, supra note 105, at 256.  
240 See Randy Kennedy, Shepard Fairey and The A.P. Settle Legal Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 12, 2011; David Ng, Shepard Fairey Gets Two Years' Probation in Obama 'Hope' 
Poster Case, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2012. 
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disclaim implied consent to any potential use; we might term this concern 
the “boilerplate horrible.”241  A related concern is that the proposal will 
discourage “tolerated uses”:  Out of fear that they may lose their rights if 
they do not proactively police them, rightsholders may no longer allow uses 
that are technically infringing, but oft permitted in practice.242 
There are several reasons why these concerns will not operate to 
restrict fair use.  As to the fear of excessive boilerplate, for institutional 
copyright holders such boilerplate is already a reality in many cases, for 
better or worse.243  The most familiar examples are the grimly-worded FBI 
Warnings that precede movies played on DVDs, or the overbroad 
disclaimers in the front matter of most books.244  To be sure, there are valid 
concerns about the reach of these copyright warnings and their chilling 
effects on users.245  However, the sky has not fallen on fair use as a result of 
these warnings; nor would it under this Article’s proposal.  Nothing in the 
above suggests that copyright boilerplate would be given preclusive effect 
or defeat an otherwise solid claim of fair use.  At most, these wholesale 
copyright warnings would simply tend to defeat arguments that the use was 
implicitly licensed—a claim that is unlikely to be strong anyway when the 
plaintiff is an institutional rightsholder who employs such boilerplate.  
A related objection is that this Article’s proposal would tend to 
undercut norms of “tolerated use.”  Tolerated use describes “[an] infringing 
                                                
241 Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2624 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (describing a 
hypothetical “mandate to purchase green vegetables” as the “broccoli horrible”). 
242 See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM.  J.L. & ARTS 617, 617 (2008) (“‘Tolerated use’ 
is a term that refers to the contemporary spread of technically infringing, but nonetheless 
tolerated, use of copyrighted works.”). 
243 See generally JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 2–25 (2011) (describing phenomenon of “copyfraud”—copyright 
overreaching, such as copyright notices placed on public domain works, which contributes 
to the expansion of the proper bounds of copyright law). 
244 The current FBI warning declares “The unauthorized reproduction of this copyrighted 
work is illegal.  Criminal copyright infringement is investigated by federal law 
enforcement agencies and is punishable by up to 5 years in prison and a fine of $250,000.”  
See David Kravets, Pirates Beware:  DVD Anti-Piracy Warning Now Twice as Fierce, 
WIRED, May 8, 2012, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/05/anti-piracy-warning-
updated.  Most books by the large publishing houses contain analogous warnings to the 
effect of “All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a 
retrieval system, or transmitted, by any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, 
photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the [the 
publisher].”  See, e.g., BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S MODERN AMERICAN USAGE at p. iv 
(3d ed. 2009). 
245 See MAZZONE, supra note 244, at 228–30 (providing examples of productive uses 
deterred by copyright warnings). 
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usage of a copyrighted work of which the copyright owner may be aware, 
yet does nothing about.”246  A typical example would be an online fan 
encyclopedia, such as A Wiki of Ice and Fire, which consists of fan-
generated content relating to George R. R. Martin’s “A Game of Thrones” 
fantasy series.247  Although much of the content on such an encyclopedia is 
protected by fair use, some content may infringe on the copyright owner’s 
right to produce “derivative works based upon” the original work.248  
However, perhaps based on “copyright owners’ judgment that the infringing 
use[] [is] complementary” to the original—i.e., it helps stimulates demand 
for the original—such uses are frequently allowed.249 
Consideration of consent in a limited class of fair use cases does not 
seriously undermine incentives to tolerate uses.  If a copyright owner judges 
a use to be complementary, he will wish to allow it whether or not consent 
is treated as a fair use factor.  Unlike, for example, trademark law—where a 
rightsholder risks forfeiting his entire property right if he is found to 
abandon it250—implied consent to a use should be evaluated on a use-by-use 
basis.  A rightsholder’s toleration of one complementary use does not mean 
he has waived all his other rights.  At most, the copyright holder may be 
found to have acquiesced in that particular use if he does not object, and the 
user will have a stronger case for fair use as a result.  This marginal 
incentive is unlikely to change the copyright holder’s behavior when there 
are independent reasons to tolerate the use. 
Both the boilerplate horrible and tolerated use concerns tend to 
overlook the pro-user elements of the consent proposal, and exaggerate its 
potential pro-author elements.  The concern in both cases is that socially 
beneficial uses will be further curtailed.  However, properly understood, this 
Article’s proposal will function in a pro-user fashion in almost all cases.  
The quantitative dimension of consent can only favor fair use.  In the 
situation of an express refusal, the user will be in the same situation as 
under current doctrine.  Consent will not be relevant, and he will need to 
make his case on the traditional fair use factors.  In contrast, intermediate 
categories of consent—such as silence or “partial consent”—will weigh in 
                                                
246 Wu, supra note 243, at 619. 
247 See A Wiki of Ice and Fire, About the Wiki, http://awoiaf.westeros.org. Though it is 
often referred to colloquially as “A Game of Thrones” (the title of the first novel in the 
series and an HBO television adaption), the actual name of the series of fantasy novels is A 
Song of Ice and Fire. 
248 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2011); see also Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. 
Supp. 2d 513, 540–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that the Harry Potter Lexicon, a fan-
generated encyclopedia about the “Harry Potter” series, was not a fair use). 
249 Wu, supra note 243, at 619. 
250 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012); Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 45–49 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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favor of fair use.251  The only situation in which considering consent will 
restrict the scope of fair use is when the user has acted in bad faith. 
On a similar note, it should also be observed that copyright 
encompasses more than the archetypal case of a large institutional 
rightsholder (e.g., Disney) against an individual user.  The temptation in 
that case, depending on one’s normative perspective, may be to favor the 
individual user.  In fact, the bulk of copyrighted material—if not necessarily 
copyright litigation—is authored and owned by individuals.252  Thus, much 
of what is being regulated by copyright law pits individual rightsholders 
against individual users—say, when a personal Facebook photo is copied by 
an acquaintance and put on her Pinterest page.  Indeed, it is in this more 
personal world in which this Article’s proposal may have the most 
relevance, as those will frequently be cases when communication costs are 
low. 
D. Interaction with Implied License and Other Doctrines 
A final objection to this Article’s proposal is that the user reliance 
interests advanced by considering consent in fair use would be better 
achieved through other copyright law reforms, such as an expansion of the 
implied license doctrine, equitable doctrines, and the elimination of 
statutory damages.  Why, the argument goes, must fair use do this work?  
Wouldn’t it be more natural to promote user reliance interests though the 
implied license doctrine, and equitable interests through doctrines like 
laches? 
As a descriptive matter, the current formulations of these other 
doctrines do not reach much of the conduct that would be encompassed by 
this Article’s proposal.  For example, the implied license doctrine often will 
not reach cases of “partial consent” because copyright law requires that 
most transfers of rights be in writing.253  As a result, licenses are implied by 
conduct only in “narrow circumstances,” and some courts further require 
that the original work must be created at the request of the licensee.254  
                                                
251 See supra Part IV.A. 
252 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
253 See 17 U.S.C. § 204 (2011) (“A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation 
of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the 
transfer, is in writing and signed . . . .”). 
254 Estate of Roberto Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2010) (“The test 
most commonly used in determining if an implied license exists with respect to most kinds 
of works asks whether the licensee requested the work, whether the creator made and 
delivered that work, and whether the creator intended that the licensee would copy and 
make use of the work.”). 
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Similarly, the scope of laches and other traditional equitable doctrines is 
often limited in copyright actions.255  Indeed, the Supreme Court recently 
held that laches can never bar a copyright action that seeks damages for 
wrongs within the three-year statutory limitations period—even when the 
plaintiff has delayed for decades in bringing suit.256  Given these 
limitations, fair use offers a more promising doctrinal route to vindicate 
user reliance interests. 
However, the current limitations of other doctrines do not counter 
the deeper objection—that it is those doctrines, and not fair use, that should 
be reformed.  An initial response to this concern is a practical one: change 
in fair use doctrine is simply a more likely route for reform.  Fair use has a 
common law tradition of evolution, incorporating new factors such as 
“transformativeness” that were not previously considered.257  Moreover, fair 
use reform can be achieved by judicial change alone, in contrast to other 
doctrines, where reform may require congressional action.258  Given the 
well-known public choice failures in copyright law, congressional reform is 
a difficult hurdle.259 
The theoretical response to this point is that fair use is a more 
flexible and tailored doctrinal tool.  For example, an expansion of implied 
license doctrine can only deal with one part of the problem identified in this 
Article: the “partial consent” situation.  In that case, an expanded implied 
license doctrine might reach similar results, with the copyright holder being 
                                                
255 See, e.g., Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that defense of laches cannot bar timely filed copyright suits).  Peter Letterese & 
Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(laches may bar retrospective relief, but cannot bar claims for prospective relief from 
copyright infringement). 
256 See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. __, No. 12-1315, slip op. at 1, 7–9 
(May 19, 2014) (holding that laches cannot be invoked to bar copyright action for damages 
within statutory limitations period despite plaintiff’s 18-year delay in filing suit), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-1315_f20h.pdf.  The Court was careful to 
note, however, that laches may sometimes curtail the scope of the relief available in 
“extraordinary circumstances,” and that the doctrine of estoppel remains available to bar a 
suit when circumstances warrant.  See id. at 18–20. 
257 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994) (citing Leval, 
supra note 4, at 1111, to highlight the importance of whether a use is “transformative” 
under the first fair use factor); Beebe, supra note 21, at 603–06 (describing the rise in 
citations to transformativeness as a fair use factor following Campbell). 
258 For example, much of the restrictiveness in implied license doctrine is driven—albeit 
not dictated— by statutes limiting copyright transfers without a written instrument.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 204 (2011).  Most obviously, statutory damages, which contribute to the “lock in” 
effect on users, are mandated by Congress.  See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2011). 
259 See, e.g., LITMAN , supra note 26, at 22–35 (discussing public choice problems in 
copyright legislation). 
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penalized for conduct tending to show assent to a use.  But that is only part 
of the issue—implied license is less well equipped to address strategic 
behaviors, such as the user’s “avoid detection” strategy (which would have 
to be addressed by reforms in equitable doctrines, such as estoppel).  By 
contrast, considering consent in fair use allows multiple dimensions to be 
evaluated simultaneously, with a strong showing on one dimension 
offsetting a weaker showing on the other. The fair use revision advocated 
here thus covers a broader range of conduct than other doctrinal reforms, 
and does so in a more contextual way.260 
CONCLUSION 
As this Article has argued, considerations relating to consent and 
refusal have been wrongly neglected in courts’ fair use analyses.  The result 
has been misguided decisions in a number of areas, or sub rosa 
consideration of consent—with attendant harms to judicial transparency and 
consistency.  This Article urges that consideration of the nature of the 
copyright owner’s consent be made an explicit fair use factor in appropriate 
cases, and provides a useful classification of consent and refusal to aid 
courts in fair use decisionmaking. 
                                                
260 Ultimately, it is conceivable that simultaneous revisions on several doctrinal fronts—
implied license doctrine, laches, unclean hands, estoppel, et al.—would reach a similar end 
result to considering consent.  (And, to be clear, I would welcome reform on all these 
fronts.)  Unless one privileges form over function, it is hard not to be agnostic as between 
these two routes to the same end.  As a practical matter, however, fair use’s capacious 
nature makes it a more likely candidate for reform. 
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